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SEEKING A CLEARER PICTURE:  ASSESSING 
THE APPROPRIATE REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK FOR BROADBAND VIDEO 
DISTRIBUTION 
Adam B. VanWagner*
 
 
This Note examines the appropriate regulatory framework for the 
distribution of commercial video content over broadband networks.  As 
online video providers such as Netflix and Hulu expand, they are beginning 
to compete directly with the video services of major cable and 
telecommunications companies.  Frequently, these companies also serve as 
a customer’s Internet service provider, leaving them in the position of 
carrying these competitive services over their broadband networks.  This 
conflict has led to calls for regulation that would protect nascent online 
video services from feared anticompetitive actions by the major providers. 
In April 2010, against the backdrop of this expanding conflict, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Comcast Corporation v. FCC dealt 
a blow to the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) ability to 
regulate in this arena.  There, the circuit court invalidated the FCC’s 
jurisdictional approach to regulating broadband Internet.  Although the 
FCC has subsequently reasserted its jurisdiction over broadband, the 
fallout from Comcast has rekindled debates as to whether broadband is best 
governed by proscriptive FCC regulation, or whether oversight of this 
marketplace should be left to the general antitrust authorities—the 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.  This Note 
discusses the jurisdictional challenges to broadband oversight faced by 
each agency, and assesses the substantive and procedural merits of FCC 
and antitrust governance regimes.  It then argues that, given the uncertainty 
regarding its authority, the FCC should abandon its efforts to regulate 
broadband video distribution in the absence of clear market harms.  
Finally, this Note proposes that this dynamic and rapidly evolving 
marketplace should develop outside the bounds of proscriptive regulations, 
with antitrust serving as a backstop if market intervention proves necessary. 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2012, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2004, University of 
Minnesota.  Many thanks to my family, friends, and Amy for their support and patience, and 
to Professor Olivier Sylvain for his guidance.  I would also like to acknowledge my use and 
enjoyment of many of the services discussed herein during the process of writing this Note.  
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INTRODUCTION 
For three weeks in the spring of 2010, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC or Commission) seemed to have a firm regulatory grip 
on the future of broadband, a technology that the FCC described as “a 
foundation for economic growth, job creation, global competitiveness and a 
better way of life.”1  On March 16, 2010, the FCC submitted to Congress 
the National Broadband Plan, a 376-page outline for improving the 
American “broadband ecosystem.”2  Developed pursuant to a 2009 
congressional mandate,3 the National Broadband Plan contains proposals 
for, among other things, providing universal broadband access to 
Americans, decreasing high-speed network costs, and establishing a 
broadband public safety infrastructure.4
The exuberance was short-lived.  On April 6, 2010, in Comcast Corp. v. 
FCC,
 
5 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit impugned the FCC’s 
regulatory authority over broadband Internet.  The court invalidated the 
FCC’s use of its ancillary jurisdiction6 under the Communications Act of 
19347 (Communications Act) in its effort to prohibit Comcast Corporation 
(Comcast) from degrading its broadband customers’ use of peer-to-peer 
network applications.8
 
 1. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CONNECTING AMERICA:  THE NATIONAL BROADBAND 
PLAN, at xi (2010) [hereinafter NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN], available at 
http://download.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf. 
  Because the FCC had relied solely on this ancillary 
jurisdiction to regulate broadband, the Comcast ruling cast doubt upon the 
Commission’s authority to oversee provisions of the National Broadband 
Plan, as well as the Commission’s ability to enforce its Internet Policy 
Statement, a set of network neutrality principles adopted by the 
Commission in 2005 that had guided its approach to supervising broadband 
 2. Id.; see also Matt Richtel & Brian Stelter, F.C.C. Questioned on Its Far-Reaching 
Plan to Expand Broadband Access, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2010, at B4. 
 3. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 
§ 6001(k)(1)–(2), 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. (123 Stat.) 115, 515–16 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 1305). 
 4. NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 1, at xi–xv. 
 5. 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 6. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 7. Pub. L. No. 416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–614 
(2006)) (Communications Act). 
 8. Comcast, 600 F.3d at 661. 
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practices.9  In response to the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, the FCC began a 
process to reassert its authority over broadband, which culminated in a 
December 2010 order wherein the Commission, for the first time, 
promulgated enforceable rules governing broadband network practice.10  
This renewed action quickly came under legal and political attack, and the 
Commission’s authority over broadband remains in active dispute.11
While the immediate issue in Comcast concerned the FCC’s ability to 
enforce specific network neutrality principles,
 
12 the broader import of the 
muddled jurisdictional picture left in the wake of the ruling is highlighted 
by the impact that broadband technology has had on a host of industries.13  
The film and television industry is among the sectors most affected by 
broadband, as widespread adoption of high-speed Internet access has 
spawned a marketplace for the distribution of video content via broadband 
networks.14  Increasingly, the formerly discrete media used for delivering 
video content—broadcast television, cable, home video, etc.—are 
converging toward a system where all distribution occurs over the digital 
channels of the Internet.15  The established business models of the film and 
television industry are being fundamentally disrupted by a system that 
allows consumers to see their favorite films and television shows online.16  
Accordingly, the Internet has become a forum for complex deal making and 
strategic positioning among content producers, traditional distributors, 
technology giants, and Internet upstarts, as each tries to stake a claim in this 
evolving distribution network.17  Conflicts in this marketplace inhere in the 
nature of broadband distribution:  the cable and telecommunications 
companies that provide broadband access to consumers effectively deliver 
to their customers programming for online video distributors that compete 
with their traditional video businesses.18
 
 9. See, e.g., Statement, Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, The 
Third Way:  A Narrowly Tailored Broadband Framework, 2–4 (May 6, 2010), 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-297944A1.pdf; see also infra notes 
 
222–31 and accompanying text.  For an explanation of the concept of network neutrality—a 
concept revolving around the notion that network operators should not be able to 
discriminate against network content, applications, or devices—by one of its leading 
proponents, see Tim Wu, Network Neutrality FAQ, 
http://www.timwu.org/network_neutrality.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). 
 10. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 11. See infra notes 273–81 and accompanying text. 
 12. See, e.g., Amy Schatz, Court Backs Comcast Over FCC, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2010, 
at B1; Edward Wyatt, U.S. Court Curbs F.C.C. Authority on Web Traffic, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
7, 2010, at A1. 
 13. See NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 1, at xi (discussing broadband’s impact 
on, among others, the education, health care, and energy sectors). 
 14. See infra Part I. 
 15. See JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS:  
AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 155 (paperback ed. 2007). 
 16. See infra Part I.B. 
 17. See infra Part I.C–D. See generally Online Television:  Hogging the Remote, 
ECONOMIST, Sept. 4, 2010, at 67, 70 (discussing tensions between online firms and media 
producers in connection with Internet video distribution). 
 18. See infra Part I.B.2. 
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As broadband video options increase, the competitive conflicts endemic 
to this marketplace have entered debates over the need for regulatory 
oversight of these new distribution channels.19  Typically, the federal 
regulator in this arena would be the FCC, which has long had express 
jurisdiction over broadcast television20 and cable networks.21  However, 
Comcast casts doubt upon this default assumption, including whether the 
FCC has the authority to govern the distribution of video content over 
broadband networks.22  Comcast also provides fuel for an ongoing debate 
concerning whether broadband competition issues should be overseen by 
the FCC, or by the federal antitrust authorities—the Antitrust Division of 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC).23
This Note assesses the appropriate jurisdictional and substantive 
framework for the regulation of video distribution over broadband 
networks.  Part I outlines the evolving marketplace for the broadband 
distribution of video content, and analyzes how online convergence impacts 
traditional distribution models in a manner that raises consumer access and 
competition policy concerns.  In particular, Part I addresses two recent 
media transactions:  Comcast’s acquisition of a controlling interest in NBC 
Universal (NBCU);
 
24 and a distribution agreement between Netflix, an 
online content distributor, and EPIX, a premium television network.25  
These agreements, which are representative of the competing interests and 
transactional complexities of the broadband media landscape, shed light on 
the potential contours of a regulatory regime for this evolving 
marketplace.26
Part II discusses federal oversight of telecommunications and media 
industries, and focuses on the jurisdictional challenges that the FCC, the 
DOJ, and the FTC face in order to establish their authority over broadband.  
Part II begins with a discussion of the FCC’s attempt to regulate broadband 
practices, and then turns to the Comcast decision, its aftermath, and the 
FCC’s December 2010 broadband rulemaking.  Part II also provides an 
overview of relevant media oversight by the DOJ and the FTC, specifically 
focusing on actions these agencies have taken in connection with the types 
of issues that have arisen in the marketplace for broadband video 
distribution.  Finally, Part II addresses recent actions by the FCC, the DOJ, 
and the FTC in the context of media and telecommunications merger 
reviews. 
 
 
 19. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 20. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006) (Title III of the Communications Act). 
 21. See id. §§ 521–573 (Title VI of the Communications Act). 
 22. See infra Part II.A. 
 23. See, e.g., NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at xxiii. 
 24. See Tim Arango, G.E. Makes It Official:  NBC Will Go to Comcast, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 4, 2009, at B3. 
 25. See Brian Stelter, Netflix to Pay Nearly $1 Billion to Add Films to On-Demand 
Service, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2010, at B3. 
 26. See infra Part I.D. 
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Part III outlines various debates relating to the appropriate model for 
federal oversight of broadband markets.  This part assesses whether 
preemptive steps are needed to address the set of conflicts that have arisen 
in the broadband video marketplace, and discusses the substantive and 
procedural efficacy of relying on either FCC or antitrust oversight of 
broadband video distribution. 
Part IV argues that the FCC’s continued jurisdictional approach to 
broadband regulation is untenable.  While acknowledging potential 
jurisdictional and administrative concerns with an antitrust oversight 
regime, Part IV concludes that the marketplace for broadband video 
distribution is best served by a hands-off, antitrust approach. 
I.  THE RISE OF BROADBAND VIDEO DISTRIBUTION 
The development of an online video distribution market is inextricably 
linked to the rapid deployment of broadband Internet service to millions of 
American consumers.  This part discusses broadband deployment, and 
provides an overview of the current marketplace for the distribution of 
video content over broadband.27  In addition, by focusing on two recent 
media transactions that involve online distribution—Comcast’s acquisition 
of a majority stake in NBCU,28 and a film distribution agreement between 
online distributor Netflix and pay TV channel EPIX29
A.  Broadband:  An Introduction 
—this part assesses 
the competitive conflicts that have animated calls for federal oversight of 
this marketplace. 
Speed matters.  The commercial distribution of video content over the 
Internet requires a technology that transfers data at a speed sufficient to 
mimic the viewing experience of traditional media.30  This technology is 
broadband, which, although somewhat nebulously defined, is often linked 
to a congressional dictate in the Telecommunications Act of 199631 (1996 
Act).  There, Congress directed the FCC to encourage the adoption of 
“advanced telecommunications capability,” which the 1996 Act defined as 
“high-speed, switched, broadband telecommunications capability that 
enables users to originate and receive high-quality voice, data, graphics, and 
video telecommunications using any technology.”32
 
 27. Because this marketplace is quickly evolving, this part does not purport to be 
authoritative, but attempts only to offer a snapshot of the developing broadband video 
landscape. 
  As the technological 
 28. See Arango, supra note 24, at B3; see also infra Part I.D.1. 
 29. See Sam Schechner, Netflix Adds to Web Films, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2010, at B4; 
see also infra Part I.D.2. 
 30. See 1 DANIEL L. BRENNER ET AL., CABLE TELEVISION AND OTHER NONBROADCAST 
VIDEO:  LAW AND POLICY § 1:24, at 1–43 (Supp. 2010) (noting that the rate of data transfer is 
crucial to the online viewing experience). 
 31. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 
U.S.C.) (1996 Act). 
 32. Id. § 706 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 157 note (1996) (Advanced Telecommunications 
Incentives)); see also Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. 
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infrastructure of the Internet has evolved, so too has the FCC’s definition of 
what speed constitutes “broadband.”33  Increasingly, the average consumer 
broadband service runs at 4.0 megabits per second, the speed necessary for 
video to be transmitted successfully over Internet connections in order to 
create an enjoyable viewing experience.34
Broadband in the United States is most often serviced via cable modems 
or digital subscriber lines (DSL), which run over the existing infrastructure 
of the cable and telecommunications industries.
 
35  The largest broadband 
providers in the United States are Comcast and AT&T, each with more than 
sixteen million subscribers.36  Among the other major broadband providers 
are Verizon Communications (Verizon), with over eight million 
subscribers, and Time Warner Cable, with nearly ten million.37  Over the 
past decade, broadband has grown considerably, from a service used by 8 
million Americans in 2000 to nearly 200 million in 2009.38
Broadband video content distribution can be categorized in several 
different ways.  First, the Internet has spawned a variety of sites that 
aggregate user-generated content, of which YouTube is the most 
ubiquitous.
 
39
 
Capability to All Ams. in a Reasonable & Timely Fashion, & Possible Steps to Accelerate 
Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 14 FCC Rcd. 
2398, 2406 (1999) [hereinafter First Broadband Deployment Report] (contextualizing the 
Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC or Commission) approach to broadband 
within the parameters of the 1996 Act). 
  Second, peer-to-peer networks that rely on the BitTorrent 
 33. Compare First Broadband Deployment Report, supra note 32, at 2406 (“[W]e define 
‘broadband’ as having the capability of supporting . . . a speed . . . in excess of 200 kilobits 
per second (kbps) in the last mile.”), with Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced 
Telecomms. Capability to All Ams. in a Reasonable & Timely Fashion, & Possible Steps to 
Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, as 
Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement Act, 25 FCC Rcd. 9556, 9559–60 (2010) 
[hereinafter Sixth Broadband Deployment Report] (defining broadband as a connection with 
download speeds of at least 4.0 megabits per second (Mbps) and upload speeds of at least 1.0 
Mbps). 
 34. See NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 1, at 21; Sixth Broadband Deployment 
Report, supra note 33, at 9559 (indicating that 4.0 Mbps “is the minimum speed required to 
stream a high-quality . . . video while leaving sufficient bandwidth for basic web browsing 
and e-mail”). 
 35. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 26. 
 36. See Press Release, Leichtman Research Grp., Over 800,000 Add Broadband in the 
Third Quarter of 2010 (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.leichtmanresearch.com/press/ 
111510release.html (noting subscriber figures as of September 30, 2010). 
 37. See id.  Time Warner Cable has been a separate corporate entity from Time Warner 
since 2009. See Time Warner Cable Spinoff To Finish Next Month, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK 
(Feb. 27, 2009, 7:48 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/02/27/time-warner-cable-spin-
off-to-finish-next-month/. 
 38. NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 1, at xi; see also Aaron Smith, Home 
Broadband 2010, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, 2 (Aug. 11, 2010), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2010/Home Broadband 2010.pdf (stating 
that two-thirds of American adults have access to broadband). 
 39. YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Apr. 20, 2011); see also Press 
Release, comScore, comScore Releases September 2010 U.S. Online Video Rankings (Oct. 
12, 2010), http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2010/10/comScore_ 
Releases_September_2010_U.S._Online_Video_Rankings/ (indicating that YouTube is the 
most visited video website on the Internet). 
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protocol allow broadband users to exchange a variety of data, including 
video files.40  Although these distribution systems are a significant 
component of the Internet video landscape, this Note focuses solely on the 
regulatory implications for the commercial distribution of professional 
content via what the FCC has termed an Online Video Programming 
Distributor (OVPD).41
B.  How Broadband Distribution Impacts the Business Models of the Film 
and Television Industries 
 
While distinct, the businesses of content production and pay television 
are largely linked, and the rise of broadband video distribution has made 
their interrelations increasingly complex.  For both content creators and 
traditional media distributors, digital convergence poses critical challenges 
to their traditional operational models in ways that implicate a potential 
regulatory scheme for this marketplace. 
1.  The Collapse of Film Industry Windows 
The film industry’s business model is based on marketing and releasing 
motion pictures through a series of media-specific steps known as 
“windows.”42  Although patterns may vary depending upon the picture, a 
typical film is initially released in theaters, a window that lasts between two 
weeks and four months.43  Home video sales and rentals represent the 
second window, which historically has started several months after the end 
of the theatrical release44 and, in recent years, has been the biggest revenue 
generator for the industry.45  The home video window now often coincides 
with video-on-demand (VOD), a service that allows consumers to access a 
program at any time through digital video systems.46
 
 40. About BitTorrent, BITTORRENT, http://www.bittorrent.com/company/about (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2011). 
  Approximately one 
 41. The FCC defines an Online Video Programming Distributor (OVPD) as “an entity 
which is engaged in the business of making available, either for free or for a charge, 
[p]rofessional [v]ideo programming delivered over the Internet to end users, through any 
means of online delivery including, but not limited to, a website, an online or mobile 
wireless portal, or an aggregator or syndicator of professional online video programming, 
such as Apple Company’s iTunes, Comcast’s FanCast XFinity, NetFlix, and Hulu.” 
Information and Discovery Request for NBC Universal, Inc., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N,  15 
(May 21, 2010) [hereinafter NBCU Questionnaire], http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public 
/attachmatch/DOC-298335A2.pdf. 
 42. See 1 THOMAS D. SELZ ET AL., ENTERTAINMENT LAW 3D:  LEGAL CONCEPTS AND 
BUSINESS PRACTICES § 1:17 (Supp. 2007) (describing the windowing release system); Alexis 
Garcia, Comment, Finding the Unobstructed Window for Internet Film Viewing, 9 UCLA 
ENT. L. REV. 243, 267 (2002) (same). 
 43. 1 SELZ ET AL., supra note 42, § 1:17. 
 44. See id. 
 45. Id.; see also Shira Ovide, Is Hollywood Going Down With the Blockbuster Ship?, 
WALL ST. J. DEAL J. (Sept. 21, 2010, 8:13 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/09/21/is-
hollywood-going-down-with-the-blockbuster-ship (citing statistics that DVD rentals and 
sales accounted for 56% of feature film revenues in 2004, and 44% in 2009). 
 46. 1 SELZ ET AL., supra note 42, § 1:17; see also SCHUYLER M. MOORE, THE BIZ:  THE 
BASIC BUSINESS, LEGAL & FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE FILM INDUSTRY 205–11 (3d ed. 2007) 
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year following the end of the theatrical release, the pay TV window begins 
on premium cable channels such as HBO and Showtime.47  This eighteen-
month period is followed by non-pay TV distribution through broadcast 
networks or channels that are included in standard cable TV packages.48  
After this sequence ends, the film may be re-licensed to cable or broadcast 
networks.49  This release system works to maximize profits by ensuring that 
the windows do not overlap, which encourages consumers to purchase the 
film twice.  For example, a consumer may see a movie in theaters and then 
buy a DVD several months later.50
Broadband distribution confounds the windows system, and has resulted 
in conflicts between content creators and their traditional distributors.
 
51  
Because the convergence of previously compartmentalized media to an all-
digital model results in the collapse of discrete distribution windows,52 the 
principal challenge for content creators is finding a way to engage in price 
discrimination where the technology of distribution no longer naturally 
differentiates between the various media associated with the windows 
system.53
As studios recognize that customers purchasing films through broadband 
networks no longer embrace a model that forces them to wait for a 
particular window, they have begun to tinker with release patterns.  For 
example, DVD sales, which have been huge revenue generators for the 
industry, have typically enjoyed an exclusive window from thirty to forty-
five days prior to the VOD release.
 
54  As physical DVD sales decline as a 
result of the rise of broadband distribution, this exclusive home video 
window has been reduced to an average of five days.55  In addition, studios 
are considering releasing pictures via high-priced VOD services during the 
theatrical window, a development that would strain their relationship with 
theater owners and create further tension between the studios and traditional 
home video retailers.56
 
(discussing video-on-demand technology and its implications for other distribution 
windows). 
  Thus, as emergent broadband delivery models 
 47. 1 SELZ ET AL., supra note 42, § 1:17. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Garcia, supra note 42, at 267; Lauren A.E. Schuker & Ethan Smith, Hollywood 
Eyes Shortcut to TV, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2010, at A1. 
 51. See generally Seth Gilbert, Cracking Release Windows:  Apple, WB Shift the Movie 
Industry, METUE (May 1, 2008), http://metue.com/05-01-2008/itunes-warner-brothers-
studios-dvd-day-and-date-releases (discussing rising tensions in the industry as film studios 
embrace new technologies that disrupt traditional distribution windows). 
 52. See, e.g., Garcia, supra note 42, at 244; Julia Boorstin, Warner Brothers Starts To 
Collapse Media Distribution Windows, CNBC (Sept. 30, 2009, 12:40 PM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/33091887/Warner_Brothers_Starts_to_Collapse_Movie_Distributio
n_Windows (describing a film studio’s decision to release films via video-on-demand prior 
to the home video window). 
 53. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 24–25. 
 54. Nat Worden, Studios Seek Out Backup to DVDs, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2010, at B6. 
 55. See id. (noting that home video sales have been declining since 2007). 
 56. See Brooks Barnes, In This War, Movie Studios Are Siding With Your Couch, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2010, at B1; Schuker & Smith, supra note 50. 
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further disrupt the windows system, film studios are increasingly 
confronted with a dilemma of embracing new avenues to reach consumers 
that will damage their relationships with their customary distributors. 
2.  The Threat to Pay Television 
The FCC defines the distributors of cable television services—cable 
operators, satellite broadcasters, and telecommunications companies—as 
multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs).57  MVPDs operate 
under a dual revenue model supported by both monthly subscriber fees and 
advertising.58  The MVPDs dominate the television marketplace, with 
approximately ninety-seven percent of American households owning 
televisions subscribing to an MVPD.59  The fees for these bundled packages 
have risen steadily, reaching an average of $64.00 per month in 2009 
compared to the 2004 average of $47.50.60  Subscription fees for MVPD 
service add up to approximately sixty billion dollars per year,61 while 
yearly advertising revenue now totals almost twenty-five billion dollars.62  
Because MVPD service is often provided over the same physical 
infrastructure as broadband, the top MVPDs coincide with the market 
leaders in the broadband industry:  Comcast again leads with almost 
twenty-three million customers, followed by DirectTV, Dish Network, and 
Time Warner Cable.63
As with the film industry, broadband distribution upsets the traditional 
MVPD model.  The advent of broadband systems that allow consumers to 
purchase a single television episode has led to concerns that consumers will 
“cut the cord” and cancel their monthly cable subscriptions in favor of a la 
carte online viewing.
 
64  This problem has become more visible because for 
two straight quarters in 2010, the MVPD industry suffered its first ever 
declines in overall subscribership.65
 
 57. See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Mkt. for the Delivery of 
Video Programming, 24 FCC Rcd. 542, 544 (2009) (13th ann. rep.). 
  Although other factors, such as a weak 
 58. See Tim Arango, Cable TV’s Big Goal:  Web Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 24, 2009, at 
B1; Jeff Bewkes, Opinion, The Coming Golden Age of Television, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2010, 
at A21. 
 59. See Martin Peers, I’m OK, You’re Not OK, Say Television Executives, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 27, 2010, at C10. 
 60. See Douglas Quenqua, Can a Mouse Cut the Cable?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2010, at 
D1. 
 61. See Brad Stone & Brian Stelter, Web TV, for Subscribers Only, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 
2009, at B1. 
 62. See Cable Advertising Revenue 1999–2009, NAT’L CABLE & TELECOMMS. ASS’N, 
http://www.ncta.com/Stats/AdvertisingRevenue.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). 
 63. See Top 25 Multichannel Video Programming Distributors as of Sept. 2010, NAT’L 
CABLE & TELECOMMS. ASS’N, http://www.ncta.com/Stats/TopMSOs.aspx (last visited Apr. 
20, 2011). 
 64. See Aaron Rutkoff, Tuning Out Cable, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2010, at A28 (defining 
cord-cutting as dropping a “cable subscription for entertainment delivered over the 
Internet”). 
 65. See Amer Barghouth, US Subscription TV Posts Another Quarterly Subscriber Loss, 
SCREEN DIGEST (Nov. 19, 2010), http://www.screendigest.com/news/us-subscription-tv-
posts-another-quarterly-subscriber-loss/view.html. 
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economy, may have been significant contributors to these declines, there are 
indications that cord-cutting is contributing to the loss of subscribers.66  As 
the threat of cord-cutting rises, and as content providers put more of their 
programs online, “the alternative of Web-based distribution, and additional 
ad revenues for programmers, raises a conflict with the desires of cable 
operators, who want programmers to provide TV episodes to their [VOD] 
service.”67
To be sure, even as they respond to the growth of broadband distribution 
by placing more content online, content providers have a significant stake 
in the MVPD model; according to one estimate, the content companies 
earned thirty billion dollars in 2010 from their share of the revenue from 
monthly cable bills.
 
68  To further complicate the dynamic, MVPDs are 
often a customer’s broadband provider as well, which means that customers 
who cut the cord are likely using the broadband Internet service provided by 
their MVPD to go “over the top” of the MVPD’s own video services.69  
This conflict between MVPDs, content providers, and consumers is at the 
center of concerns that MVPDs might engage in anticompetitive practices 
against broadband video services in order to protect their core video 
business.70
C.  The Marketplace for Broadband Video Content 
 
As the number of consumers connected to broadband increases,71
 
 66. See Brian Stelter, Cord Cutting?  Cable Subscriptions Drop Again, N.Y. TIMES 
MEDIA DECODER (Nov. 17, 2010, 2:29 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/ 
11/17/cord-cutting-cable-subscriptions-drop-again (quoting a cable industry analyst as 
saying that it is “becoming increasingly difficult to dismiss the impact of over-the-top 
substitution on video subscriber performance”). But see Ryan Nakashima, Cable Companies 
Strike Back at Cord-Cutting Idea, USA TODAY (Feb. 17, 2011, 10:18 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2011-02-17-cable-losses_N.htm (noting that the MVPD 
industry gained between 200,000 and 250,000 subscribers in the fourth quarter of 2010, and 
quoting an industry analyst as stating that “[t]he notion that people are disconnecting their 
pay TV connections in favor of Netflix has always been a good story but there’s been very 
little evidence that it’s actually happening in any material numbers”). 
 a 
variety of services has developed to deliver commercial video over 
broadband networks.  This section outlines the major participants in this 
marketplace, and discusses how their emergence has generated conflicts 
with content producers and MVPDs.  This section also discusses the market 
for set-top boxes, hardware devices that allow broadband video to be 
viewed directly on television sets, as well as the pay television industry’s 
response to online distribution. 
 67. 1 BRENNER ET AL., supra note 30, § 1:24. 
 68. See Sam Schechner & Geoffrey A. Fowler, Amazon Grabs the TV Remote, WALL ST. 
J., Sept. 1, 2010, at B1. 
 69. See supra notes 36–37, 63 and accompanying text. 
 70. See Schatz, supra note 12. 
 71. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
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1.  The Streamers 
a.  Netflix 
Netflix, a company launched in 1999 as an Internet-based DVD rental 
service,72 is seen by some as the primary threat to the traditional film and 
television distribution models.73  In its early years, Netflix fended off 
challenges from home video leaders Blockbuster and Walmart, both of 
which attempted to establish web-based rental services.74  The company 
entered the broadband distribution market in 2007 with Watch Instantly, a 
service that initially allowed subscribers to Netflix’s DVD rental service to 
stream video content over computers, mobile phones, or televisions 
connected to a Netflix-enabled device.75  In November 2010, Netflix 
announced a streaming-only subscription service for $7.99 per month.76  
Netflix has experienced significant growth since it launched Watch 
Instantly, boasting over twenty million subscribers at the end of 2010.77  As 
CEO Reed Hastings stated, “This growth is clearly driven by the strength of 
our streaming offering.  In fact, by every measure, we are now primarily a 
streaming company that also offers DVD-by-mail.”78  The impact of Watch 
Instantly suggests that Netflix could become a replacement for traditional 
pay TV services, although Netflix maintains that it is merely a 
complementary service that will not lead to cord-cutting.79
Netflix’s streaming service has had a dramatic effect on the broadband 
landscape.  According to one study, during peak hours, Watch Instantly 
accounts for one-fifth of the broadband traffic in the United States.
 
80
 
 72. See Saul Hansell, Wal-Mart Ends Online Video Rentals and Promotes Netflix, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 20, 2005, at C3. 
  The 
increasing strength of the company manifested itself in November 2010, 
 73. See, e.g., ECONOMIST, supra note 17, at 70; Nat Worden, Netflix Gains as Online 
Video Wins Fans, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 14, 2011, 5:38 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703584804576144371093782778.html 
(describing Netflix as a “disruptive force in the TV and film industry”). 
 74. See Hansell, supra note 72. 
 75. See Miguel Helft, The Shifting Business of Renting Movies, by the Disc or the Click, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2007, at C1; Press Release, Netflix, Netflix Offers Subscribers the 
Option of Instantly Watching Movies on Their PCs (Jan. 16, 2007), 
http://netflix.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=201. 
 76. Press Release, Netflix, Netflix Launches U.S. Subscription Plan for Streaming 
Movies & TV Shows Over the Internet for $7.99 a Month (Nov. 22, 2010), 
http://netflix.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=376. 
 77. See Press Release, Netflix, Netflix Releases Fourth-Quarter 2010 Financial Results 
(Jan. 26, 2011), http://netflix.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=383; see also Nick 
Wingfield, Netflix Sees Surge in Subscribers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2011, at B9 (noting that 
Netflix added 7.7 million subscribers in 2010). 
 78. Press Release, Netflix, Netflix Announces Q3 2010 Financial Results (Oct. 20, 
2010), http://netflix.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=373. 
 79. See Schechner, supra note 29. 
 80. See Fall 2010 Global Internet Phenomena, SANDVINE, 
http://www.sandvine.com/news/global_broadband_trends.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). 
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when Level 3 Communications (Level 3), an Internet backbone provider81 
that handles data transport service for Watch Instantly, complained publicly 
that Comcast had demanded a recurring fee from Level 3 in order to 
transport data over Comcast’s broadband networks.82  Level 3 intimated 
that Comcast imposed the fee in an effort to hinder Netflix’s ability to 
compete with Comcast’s MVPD business, but Comcast claimed that the fee 
was imposed only because of the dramatic increase in Level 3 traffic being 
carried over Comcast’s network.83  Regardless of the motivation, the 
episode highlighted a core concern of those pressing for federal intervention 
into this developing marketplace:  that an MVPD/broadband provider such 
as Comcast would be incentivized and able to disrupt the flow of 
competitive broadband video services over its networks.84
b.  Hulu 
 
Launched in March 2008, Hulu is the most prominent online broadband 
distributor of broadcast television programming.85  Hulu is a joint venture 
among NBCU, News Corporation, and The Walt Disney Company,86 the 
parent companies of broadcast networks NBC, Fox, and ABC, 
respectively.87  The site distributes programming from the three networks, 
as well as a host of other content producers.88  Created in part as a response 
to the rise of content aggregators such as YouTube,89 Hulu’s free, ad-based 
model allows users to stream a limited number of recently aired television 
episodes.90  In 2010, under pressure to increase revenue, the company 
launched Hulu Plus, a subscription service that provides users with access 
to full seasons of current television shows,91 at a cost of $7.99 per month.92
 
 81. Internet backbone providers are companies that supply the data transport services 
necessary to connect regional networks to one another.  See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra 
note 
 
15, at 131-34. 
 82. See Brian Stelter, Netflix Partner Says Comcast “Toll” Threatens Online Video 
Delivery, N.Y. TIMES MEDIA DECODER (Nov. 29, 2010, 9:45 PM), 
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/netflix-partner-says-comcast-toll-
threatens-online-video-delivery. 
 83. See id.; see also Daniel Golding, The Real Story Behind the Comcast-Level 3 Battle, 
GIGAOM (Dec. 1, 2010, 1:07 PM), http://gigaom.com/2010/12/01/comcast-level-3-battle. 
 84. See Stelter, supra note 82. 
 85. See Chuck Salter, The Unlikely Mogul, FAST COMPANY, Nov. 2009, at 98, 100; Jason 
Kilar, Welcome to Hulu, HULU BLOG (Mar. 12, 2008), http://blog.hulu.com/ 
2008/03/12/welcome-to-hulu (the author is the current CEO of Hulu). 
 86. About, HULU, http://www.hulu.com/about (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). 
 87. Of the major broadcast networks, only CBS does not have a presence on Hulu. See 
Brad Stone & Brian Stelter, ABC To Add Its Shows to Videos on Hulu, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 
2009, at B7. 
 88. Content, HULU, http://www.hulu.com/partners (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). 
 89. See 1 BRENNER ET AL., supra note 30, § 1:24 & n.5; see also Salter, supra note 85, at 
103 (discussing the creation of Hulu as, in part, a reaction to the posting of broadcast 
network content on YouTube). 
 90. See Brian Stelter, Hulu Offers a $9.99 Subscription to Full Season of Current TV 
Shows, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2010, at B4. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Jason Kilar, Hulu Plus Launches Out of Preview for $7.99/month, HULU BLOG 
(Nov. 17, 2010), http://blog.hulu.com/2010/11/17/hulu-plus-launches-out-of-preview-for-7-
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Hulu has been a focal point of tension between consumers, content 
creators, and MVPDs.  In a recent example, Fox pulled its shows from Hulu 
in the New York City area during a fall 2010 battle over redistribution fees 
with Cablevision, a MVPD.93  During the dispute, Fox programming was 
not available to Cablevision’s MVPD customers, but many of those 
customers still had access to Fox programs via Hulu and Fox.com.94  
Accordingly, Fox removed the content from Hulu in an apparent attempt to 
gain leverage in the ongoing negotiations.95  After viewer outcry, Fox 
restored its content on Hulu, but the action nevertheless highlighted the 
growing tension that Internet-based distribution imposes on the relationship 
between MVPDs and content providers.96
2.  From Brick and Mortar to Ones and Zeros 
 
The broadband distribution of video content has raised concerns for the 
companies who have dominated the marketplace for physical home video 
sales:  retailers such as Walmart, Target, and Best Buy.97  As DVD sales 
slip, these chains have reduced their in-store sales, and have looked for 
digital options as replacements.98  After losing an earlier battle with Netflix 
for web-based DVD rentals,99 Walmart re-entered the broadband market 
with its February 2010 purchase of Vudu, a streaming video service that 
offers new release movie rentals and sales over broadband-connected 
devices.100  Best Buy made its broadband push in November 2009 by 
entering into an agreement with CinemaNow, a streaming service that 
allows customers to purchase films and television shows on the same day 
they are released in the home video window, and also offers streaming 
movie rentals.101
 
99month; Todd Spangler, Hulu Chops Premium Plan to $7.99, MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Nov. 
17, 2010, 8:09 AM), http://www.multichannel.com/article/459992-Hulu_Chops_Premium_ 
Plan_to_7_99.php. 
 
 93. See Brian Stelter, In Brief Blackout, Web Becomes a Weapon in Fox-Cablevision 
War, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2010, at B3. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See Miguel Bustillo, Wal-Mart to Resume Online Movie Sales, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 
2010, at B2; Sarah McBride & Merissa Marr, Target, a Big DVD Seller, Warns Studios over 
Download Pricing, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2006, at A1. 
 98. See Bustillo, supra note 97. 
 99. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 100. See Bustillo, supra note 97. 
 101. See Ben Fritz, Best Buy Launching Digital Movie Service with CinemaNow, L.A. 
TIMES COMPANY TOWN (Nov. 2, 2009, 9:00 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/ 
entertainmentnewsbuzz/2009/11/best-buy-launching-digital-movie-service-with-
cinemanow.html; Richard Lawler, Best Buy’s Internet Movie Store Launches This Month 
Under the CinemaNow Brand, ENGADGET (May 18, 2010, 8:17 AM), 
http://www.engadget.com/2010/05/18/best-buys-internet-movie-store-launches-this-month-
under-the-ci. 
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3.  The Digital Giants 
Both Amazon.com and Apple have entered the market for broadband 
video distribution over the past several years.  In 2008, Amazon launched a 
web-based streaming service called Amazon Video on Demand that sells 
and rents feature films and television episodes.102  Consumers do not need 
to download files in order to make a purchase through Amazon Video on 
Demand; the system provides online storage for titles and allows customers 
to access these at any time, from any device.103  In February 2011, Amazon 
announced that it was adding a complimentary video streaming service to 
Amazon Prime, the company’s premium package shipment service, which 
costs $79.00 per year.104  The move is seen as directly targeting Netflix as 
the two jockey for leadership in the online streaming market.105  Apple’s 
digital distribution of video content also began in 2008 through its iTunes 
marketplace, which requires customers to purchase and download 
individual films and television episodes prior to viewing on computers or 
mobile devices.106  Like Amazon, Apple’s service offers both sales and 
rentals of films and television shows.107  Apple is currently the market 
leader for on-demand broadband video distribution, handling approximately 
fifty-seven percent of video transactions and fifty-three percent of online 
television show purchases, far outstripping Amazon’s five percent and six 
percent share in these respective markets.108
4.  Set-Top Boxes and the Battle for the Living Room 
 
The distribution channels discussed above offer consumers an array of 
options to replace the bundles of programming sold by MVPDs with free, 
inexpensive, or a la carte broadband viewing.  For an average consumer to 
duplicate the traditional home video and television experience, however, 
cord-cutting requires accessing disparate online services and signing up for 
multiple subscription contracts, all while experiencing these programs on a 
computer screen or mobile device.109
 
 102. See Brad Stone, Amazon Plans an Online Store for Movies and TV Shows, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 17, 2008, at C8. 
  These factors suggest that, on their 
own, the evolving broadband distribution models are unlikely to compete 
 103. See id. 
 104. Jacqui Cheng, Amazon Takes on Netflix with Movie Streaming Service for Prime, 
ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 22, 2011, 9:37 AM), http://arstechnica.com/media/news/2011/02/ 
amazon-takes-on-netflix-with-movie-streaming-service-for-prime.ars. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Saul Hansell, ITunes Movies:  A Tuna Sandwich, N.Y. TIMES BITS (Jan. 15, 2008, 
2:09 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/15/itunes-movies-a-tuna-sandwich; see also 
What’s on iTunes?, ITUNES, http://www.apple.com/itunes/whats-on (last visited Apr. 20, 
2011). 
 107. See Yukari Iwatani Kane & Shira Ovide, Apple Tries Again at TV, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 2, 2010, at B1. 
 108. See Geoffrey A. Fowler & Sam Schechner, A New Digital Battlefield, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 3, 2010, at B1. 
 109. See, e.g., supra notes 76, 92 and accompanying text. 
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with a bundled MVPD service that can be accessed with a remote control 
from the comfort of one’s living room sofa.110
That analysis changes with a set-top box, a hardware device that allows 
broadband video services to be viewed through a television.
   
111  Many of the 
broadband video services discussed above have made agreements with 
these manufacturers so that consumers will be able to access the service 
through a television interface,112 access that is often featured prominently 
on the websites of OVPDs.113
Set-top boxes exist in a number of forms.  Several companies sell a 
dedicated external device that connects Internet-based media services to a 
television, of which AppleTV,
 
114 Roku115 and Boxee116 are the most 
prominent.  In addition, electronics manufacturers are beginning to build 
broadband video connectivity into products such as televisions, Blu-ray 
players, and gaming consoles.117  As an indication of the importance of this 
functionality, Best Buy’s agreement with CinemaNow118 allows the retailer 
to market the video streaming service in connection with electronics 
equipment sales.119
In the fall of 2010, Google launched its iteration of a set-top box, a video 
searching system called Google TV that is currently integrated into three 
products:  a television and Blu-ray player from Sony and a set-top box from 
Logitech.
 
120  Through a television interface, Google TV allows users to 
search for video content from the Internet, MVPD services, and local 
storage devices, such as DVRs.121  Google has received support from a 
number of cable networks, including Time Warner—owner of HBO, TNT, 
TBS and CNN—to optimize their web portals for viewing through Google 
TV-enabled televisions.122
 
 110. See Quenqua, supra note 
  However, Google TV cannot access all Internet 
video programming, as broadcast networks ABC, CBS, and NBC 
60. 
 111. See generally Kelli B. Grant, Apple TV:  The Latest of Many Viewing Options, WALL 
ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB128363245566734521.html. 
 112. See id.; see also 1 RICHARD RAYSMAN ET AL., EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND THE 
LAW:  FORMS AND ANALYSIS § 1.03[4][e], at 1-32–32.1 (Supp. 2010). 
 113. See, e.g., Hulu Plus:  Devices, HULU, http://www.hulu.com/plus?src= 
masthead#devices (last visited Apr. 20, 2011); Netflix Ready Devices, NETFLIX, 
http://www.netflix.com/NetflixReadyDevices (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). 
 114. See Kane & Ovide, supra note 107. 
 115. ROKU, http://www.roku.com (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). 
 116. BOXEE, http://www.boxee.tv (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). 
 117. See Grant, supra note 111. 
 118. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 119. Direct to Your Living Room, CINEMANOW, http://www.cinemanow.com/ 
Devices.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). 
 120. Get It – Google TV, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/tv/getit.html (last visited Apr. 
20, 2011). 
 121. See Verne G. Kopytoff, Sony Unveils the First Google TV, N.Y. TIMES BITS (Oct. 
12, 2010, 8:33 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/12/sony-unveils-the-first-google-
tv. 
 122. See Todd Spangler, Google TV Tunes to Turner, HBO, CNBC, Netflix and Others, 
MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Oct. 4, 2010, 1:00 PM), http://www.multichannel.com/article/ 
458030-Google_TV_Tunes_To_Turner_HBO_CNBC_Netflix_And_Others.php. 
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specifically have blocked Google TV’s software from accessing video 
content on their websites, as has Hulu.123
Hulu is indicative of the conflicts that arise when broadband video 
content is merged with the traditional television experience through a set-
top box.  The broadcast networks that own Hulu exert control over how 
Hulu uses their content, and have not allowed set-top boxes to connect to 
Hulu’s free, ad-supported content.
 
124  The problem for the networks is that, 
if consumers can use a set-top box to access a free, high-quality stream 
through Hulu’s website and watch it on a television, the networks’ ability to 
charge heightened pricing for retransmission fees from cable services might 
be jeopardized.125  However, Hulu Plus is accessible through several set-top 
boxes, likely because the subscription model allows the networks to offset 
any proceeds they might lose from MVPDs.126
5.  The MVPDs Respond:  TV Everywhere 
 
The advance of broadband delivery of video programming has triggered a 
dynamic response from cable networks and MVPDs, driven by their 
concerns over cord-cutting.127  That response is TV Everywhere, a service 
that provides online access to MVPD programming, but only to customers 
who purchase standard bundled cable service packages from an MVPD.128  
TV Everywhere service includes access to online MVPD content from any 
broadband-connected device, such as computers, tablets, and mobile 
phones.129  Time Warner CEO Jeff Bewkes and Comcast CEO Brian 
Roberts were the principal developers of TV Everywhere.130  Bewkes, 
whose company produces a significant amount of cable content through its 
ownership of TNT, TBS, CNN and other networks, has promoted TV 
Everywhere as a means of competing directly for the broadband space by 
enhancing the experience of traditional cable television users.131  Others 
have expressed a more cynical view, arguing that TV Everywhere is an 
attempt to force the outmoded business model of the MVPDs onto the 
developing system of online distribution.132
 
 123. See Sam Schechner & Amir Efrati, Networks, Google Spar Over Web TV, WALL ST. 
J., Oct. 22, 2010, at B1. 
 
 124. See, e.g., Marvin Ammori, Copyright’s Latest Communications Policy:  Content-
Lock-Out and Compulsory Licensing for Internet Television, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 
375, 375–76 (2010) (describing that pressure from Hulu’s content partners resulted in Hulu 
blocking its content from Boxee, the set-top box service); Jason Kilar, Doing Hard Things, 
HULU BLOG (Feb. 18, 2009), http://blog.hulu.com/2009/02/18/doing-hard-things. 
 125. See Ammori, supra note 124, at 376–77. 
 126. See Schechner & Fowler, supra note 68. 
 127. See generally Stone & Stelter, supra note 61. 
 128. See Ronald Grover et al., Revenge of the Cable Guys, BUS. WK., Mar. 22 & 29, 
2010, at 38, 40. 
 129. See David Carr, Faith in Its Shows, on Any Medium, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2010, at 
B1. 
 130. See Grover et al., supra note 128, at 40. 
 131. See id. at 40–44. 
 132. See, e.g., Karl Bode, Will Cable’s “TV Everywhere” Be a Big Pile of Fail?, 
BROADBAND DSL REPORTS (Mar. 24, 2010), http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/107516. 
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Comcast officially launched its version of TV Everywhere, Xfinity TV, 
in October 2010.133  According to Comcast, Xfinity TV contains video 
from ninety content providers, including 25,000 TV episodes and 30,000 
movies.134  The service also offers rental of TV shows and movies through 
a VOD section.135  Although the bulk of the content on Xfinity TV is 
accessible only to Comcast cable service subscribers, the site contains a 
significant amount of free content, much of which Hulu supplies to the 
Xfinity portal.136
As sites such as Xfinity TV roll out to consumers, the backers of TV 
Everywhere acknowledge that the service is an attempt to preserve the 
MVPD’s dual revenue stream as television moves into the broadband 
age.
 
137  Public interest groups have requested that the DOJ and the FTC 
inquire into whether TV Everywhere violates antitrust laws, suggesting that 
the MVPDs have colluded to divide up the online video marketplace among 
the incumbent MVPDs, and that TV Everywhere will operate to end 
competition from upstart broadband distributors.138  Regardless of the 
merits of these allegations, the development of TV Everywhere suggests 
that stakeholders in the MVPD business have acknowledged the rise of 
broadband distribution and intend to fight for this new distribution space.139
D.  Two Representative Agreements 
 
Companies with stakes in the future of video distribution have recently 
made collaborative agreements that highlight the increasing importance of 
broadband distribution, as well as the growing tensions between broadband 
and traditional distribution models.  This section outlines two of these 
recent agreements and their implications for broadband video. 
1.  Comcast/NBC Universal 
In December 2009, Comcast reached an agreement to acquire fifty-one 
percent of NBCU, the media conglomerate that General Electric and 
Vivendi had jointly controlled.140  The agreement was consummated in 
January 2011 following an FCC and DOJ merger review process that lasted 
over a year.141
 
 133. See Todd Spangler, Comcast Opens Xfinity TV Online to All Video Subs, 
MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Oct. 25, 2010, 5:28 PM), http://www.multichannel.com/article/
458973-Comcast_Opens_Xfinity_TV_Online_To_All_ Video_Subs.php. 
  For $13.75 billion, Comcast gained control of the NBC 
 134. See id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See Bewkes, supra note 58. 
 138. See Cecilia Kang, Public Interest Groups Call for Antitrust Probe of TV Everywhere, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2010, at A9. 
 139. See Bewkes, supra note 58. 
 140. See Arango, supra note 24. 
 141. See Brian Stelter & Tim Arango, Comcast-NBC Deal Wins Federal Approval, N.Y. 
TIMES MEDIA DECODER (Jan. 18, 2011, 2:03 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2011/01/18/f-c-c-approves-comcast-nbc-deal.  For a discussion on dual merger review by the 
FCC and the antitrust authorities, see infra Part II.C. 
2011] SEEKING A CLEARER PICTURE 2927 
broadcast network, several NBC-owned local broadcasters, multiple cable 
television networks, and the Universal movie studio.142
The acquisition of NBCU provides Comcast with the type of content that 
it can potentially use to leverage its TV Everywhere service against 
unaffiliated online distributors.
 
143  As a result, the FCC and DOJ reviews 
focused, in particular, on the rise of broadband video distribution, and the 
impact that the merged entity would have on this developing 
marketplace.144  The FCC, for example, inquired into allegations that 
Comcast would withhold NBCU content from online distributors in order to 
preserve its dominant position in the MVPD business.145  In a May 2010 
questionnaire, the FCC asked Comcast to “[d]escribe in detail all 
discussions, deliberations, analyses, and decisions related to providing or 
not providing [NBCU] [v]ideo [p]rogramming to unaffiliated Online Video 
Programming Distributors, including but not limited to Boxee, YouTube, 
Amazon, and iTunes.”146  During the review process, the DOJ made similar 
inquiries with respect to the merged entity’s ability to hold exclusive sway 
over online content.147  In response, Comcast argued that the reviewing 
agencies should not impose rules regarding the “rapidly evolving” online 
video market.148
In approving the merger, both the FCC and DOJ imposed a significant 
number of conditions that concerned broadband video distribution.
 
149  For 
example, the FCC restricted Comcast’s ability to withhold NBCU content 
from online competitors and barred Comcast from degrading or blocking 
the flow of competitive video content over its broadband networks.150  For 
its part, the DOJ forced Comcast to divest itself of managerial oversight of 
Hulu.151  In addition, the DOJ barred Comcast from requiring content 
providers to agree to license terms that would limit broadband distributors’ 
access to video content.152
 
 142. See Arango, supra note 
  The combined effect of these conditions 
constitutes an attempt by the reviewing agencies to provide online 
24. 
 143. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 144. See, e.g., Martin Peers, Comcast Could Suffer From Universal Access, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 30, 2010, at C12; Joe Flint, FCC is Digging Deep as It Reviews Comcast-NBC 
Universal Deal, L.A. TIMES COMPANY TOWN (May 25, 2010, 3:46 PM), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/entertainmentnewsbuzz/2010/05/fcc-is-digging-deep-as-its-
reviews-comcast-nbc-universal-deal.html. 
 145. See Flint, supra note 144. 
 146. NBCU Questionnaire, supra note 41, at 7. 
 147. See Amy Schatz et al., Comcast NBC Deal Review Quickens, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 
2010, at B11. 
 148. See id. 
 149. Stelter & Arango, supra note 141. 
 150. News, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Grants Approval of Comcast-NBCU 
Transaction, (Jan. 18, 2011), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
304134A1.pdf; see also Stelter & Arango, supra note 141. 
 151. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Allows Comcast-NBCU 
Joint Venture To Proceed with Conditions (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 
2011/January/11-at-061.html. 
 152. Id. 
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distributors with a strong foundation upon which to compete against 
incumbent MVPDs.153
2.  Netflix/EPIX 
 
Netflix’s Watch Instantly streaming video collection was primarily 
comprised of older films for the first few years of its existence.154  
Streaming rights to newer, more popular titles typically were locked up in 
agreements with premium cable channels like HBO and Showtime.155  That 
changed in August 2010, when Netflix entered into an exclusive five-year 
streaming agreement with EPIX, a premium TV channel that controls rights 
to movies from Paramount, Lionsgate, and MGM.156  The agreement 
provides Netflix with access to 1500 titles from the studios, and could 
potentially cost Netflix up to one billion dollars in licensing fees.157  
Pursuant to the agreement, the films will be available on Netflix following a 
ninety-day period of exclusivity on EPIX’s pay TV channel.158  The 
agreement complements an extant 2008 deal between Netflix and the pay 
TV channel Starz, which gives Netflix streaming rights to content from 
Sony and Disney, rights that Starz controls through its pay TV license with 
the film studios.159  The magnitude of the EPIX deal further demonstrates 
that Netflix has staked its future on online streaming and is moving away 
from its core business of mailing DVDs to customers.160
For a number of reasons, the Netflix-EPIX deal presages rising tensions 
between broadband distributors, content providers, and MVPDs.  First, the 
deal suggests the increasing value of delivering content over broadband.
 
161  
The Starz deal that Netflix signed in 2008 costs Netflix $30 million per 
year; the EPIX deal carries an anticipated $200 million annual fee.162
 
 153. Joelle Tessler, Comcast, NBC Deal Opens Door for Online Video, USA TODAY 
(Feb. 28, 2011, 9:54 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2011-02-28-comcast-online-
video_N.htm.  These conditions are further discussed in Part II.C infra. 
  
 154. See Saul Hansell, ITunes Movie Rentals and Netflix Online:  Different Markets, N.Y. 
TIMES BITS (Jan. 16, 2008, 5:13 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/16/itunes-
movie-rentals-and-netflix-online-different-markets. 
 155. See Brian Stelter, Netflix To Stream Films From Paramount, Lions Gate, MGM, 
N.Y. TIMES MEDIA DECODER (Aug. 10, 2010, 8:13 AM), 
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/10/netflix-to-stream-films-from-paramount-
lionsgate-mgm. 
 156. See Schechner, supra note 29. 
 157. See id.; Barry Silverstein, Netflix-Epix Deal Puts TV Biz on Notice, BRANDCHANNEL 
(Aug. 11, 2010, 11:00 AM), http://brandchannel.com/home/post/2010/08/11/Netflix-Epix-
Moves-Needle.aspx. 
 158. See Schechner, supra note 29; see also Press Release, EPIX, Epix And Netflix 
Announce Exclusive Internet-Only Deal to Instantly Stream EPIX Movies to Netflix 
Members (Aug. 10, 2010), http://epixnews.tumblr.com/post/931723470/epix-and-netflix-
announce-exclusive-internet-only-deal. 
 159. See Stelter, supra note 155. 
 160. See Silverstein, supra note 157. 
 161. See Michael Corkery, Netflix’s Achilles Heel:  Content Costs?, WALL ST. J. DEAL J. 
(Aug. 10, 2010, 2:50 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/08/10/netflixs-achilles-heel-
content-costs. 
 162. Id. 
2011] SEEKING A CLEARER PICTURE 2929 
These figures indicate to content producers that broadband distribution 
windows can compensate for the demise of traditional windows.163  
Second, the deal provides Netflix with access to new releases in a far earlier 
window than it had previously enjoyed, which suggests that it now directly 
competes in these windows with premium channels such as HBO and 
Showtime, and with bundled MVPD services more generally.164  Indeed, 
Time Warner Cable has indicated that it will not carry EPIX as part of its 
cable service packages, in large part because of the Netflix-EPIX deal.165  
Contrary to Netflix’s assertions,166 the EPIX agreement suggests that the 
online distributor is increasingly becoming a substitute for the entrenched 
models of the MVPDs.167  Netflix also engenders conflict with its content 
providers, who recognize that Netflix’s effect on film and MVPD 
distribution channels may diminish their own revenue streams.168  As a 
result, these content providers may become wary about licensing their 
content to Netflix and other online distributors on the same financial terms 
as they have in the past, if indeed they continue to license to them at all.169
II.  FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF BROADBAND AND MEDIA INDUSTRIES 
 
As the discussion in Part I suggests, the prevalence of broadband 
distribution strains the relationship between MVPDs, online distributors, 
content producers, and consumers.  These tensions are developing against a 
broadband regulatory environment in a state of flux.  Although the recent 
growth of broadband occurred under deregulatory conditions, its increasing 
centrality to everyday life has led to calls for oversight.170
 
 163. See Worden, supra note 
  For 
commentators addressing the question of federal oversight of broadband—a 
54 (quoting Viacom’s COO Tom Dooley as stating, “The 
[Netflix-EPIX] deal clearly demonstrated that these new players are going to represent 
significant revenue streams to studios. . . .  There is a new market developing that’s 
beginning to replace the physical DVD business.”).  
 164. See Stelter, supra note 155. 
 165. See Brett Lang, Time Warner Cable Just Says No to Epix, THE WRAP (Sept. 15, 
2010, 2:07 PM), http://www.thewrap.com/television/article/time-warner-wont-carry-epix-
20883. 
 166. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 167. See Stelter, supra note 155 (quoting Netflix executive who, when asked about 
content that Netflix was still unable to acquire because of content providers’ agreements 
with HBO, responded, “Every deal expires . . . and every deal has to be renewed”).  Netflix’s 
recent entry into original programming further highlights its ability to compete directly with 
premium TV channels and MVPDs. See Brian Stelter, Netflix Gets Into the TV Business, 
N.Y. TIMES MEDIA DECODER (Mar. 18, 2011, 1:22 PM), 
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/netflix-gets-into-the-tv-business-with-
fincher-deal.  For a discussion on other efforts by broadband distributors to produce original 
content, see Sam Schechner, Web Shows Get Ambitious, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2011, at B4 
(noting that broadband distributors would be able to compete more effectively with 
traditional MVPD services if the first release window occurred through the online service). 
 168. See Tim Arango, Time Warner Views Netflix as a Fading Star, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 
2010, at B1 (discussing the shifting perceptions of content providers toward Netflix as its 
broadband distribution dominance has risen). 
 169. See id. 
 170. See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
529, 531 (2009). 
2930 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
debate often associated with network neutrality—a fault line exists between 
those who believe presumptive FCC regulation is necessary, and those who 
feel that antitrust law should be the arbiter of competitive issues in 
broadband markets.171  As a general matter, the governance of the Internet 
would seem to fall within the default regulatory ambit of the FCC.172  After 
years of taking a mostly hands-off approach, the FCC has made efforts to 
assert its authority over broadband.173  However, in Comcast Corp. v. 
FCC,174 the D.C. Circuit delivered a significant setback to the FCC’s ability 
to regulate broadband by rejecting the FCC’s jurisdictional approach to an 
order forcing Comcast to alter its broadband network practices.175  The 
FCC pressed on from the Comcast decision and, in a December 2010 order 
(Net Neutrality Order), adopted enforceable rules for broadband network 
practices, in which the continuing proliferation of broadband video played a 
central role.176  However, because of the significant jurisdictional 
ambiguity following Comcast, and the political furor of the network 
neutrality debate, whether the FCC’s December order becomes a permanent 
oversight regime remains to be seen.177
This part discusses federal oversight of broadband and media industries, 
and, in particular, addresses questions concerning FCC, DOJ, and FTC 
jurisdictional authority over broadband.  Part II.A discusses the FCC’s 
attempt to regulate broadband, the Comcast decision, and its aftermath.  
Part II.B highlights the antitrust response to competition concerns in 
broadband and other media industries.  Part II.C discusses the process of 
dual agency review of telecommunications and media industry mergers, and 
highlights several recent mergers that have affected broadband. 
  Consequently, the question as to 
whether the FCC or the antitrust authorities should have jurisdiction over 
broadband remains open. 
A.  The FCC’s Attempt To Regulate Broadband 
The FCC might have had broadband to itself.  At first blush, broadband 
appears to fall within the general jurisdictional grant of the 
 
 171. Compare Barbara van Schewick, Towards an Economic Framework for Network 
Neutrality Regulation, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 329, 329 (2007) (arguing that 
proscriptive regulation is necessary), with Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Antitrust Oversight of 
an Antitrust Dispute:  An Institutional Perspective on the Net Neutrality Debate, 7 J. ON 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 19, 21 (2009) (arguing that broadband competition concerns 
are best addressed through antitrust law). 
 172. See Nuechterlein, supra note 171, at 50 (“It was undisputed until recently that, at the 
federal level, the FCC exclusively occupied the field of commercial telecommunications 
regulation, supplemented only by the antitrust oversight of the Justice Department.”). 
 173. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 174. 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 175. Id. at 644. 
 176. FED COMMC’NS COMM’N, Preserving the Open Internet, 8–9, 13 (Dec. 21, 2010), 
[hereinafter Net Neutrality Order] (rep. and order), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ 
attachmatch/FCC-10-201A1.pdf; Ryan Lawler, Online Video at the Heart of Net Neutrality 
Order, GIGAOM (Dec. 28, 2010, 10:00 AM), http://gigaom.com/video/online-video-net-
neutrality. 
 177. See infra notes 273–81 and accompanying text. 
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Communications Act, which applies to “all interstate and foreign 
communication by wire or radio and all interstate and foreign transmission 
of energy by radio.”178  Pursuant to this grant and the specific authority 
given to the FCC in the Communications Act, the FCC has been the 
principal regulator of the American communications system since the 
Commission’s creation in 1934, and it was believed that the FCC would 
possess regulatory authority over broadband by default.179
1.  Broadband Classification and Ancillary Jurisdiction 
  However, 
Commission decisions made during the 2000s regarding the classification 
of broadband sowed the seeds for its jurisdictional defeat in Comcast.  The 
Comcast ruling not only disrupts the default assumption regarding the 
FCC’s jurisdiction over the Internet, but also invites an inquiry into whether 
the FCC should be the agency governing broadband practices, including the 
developing market for broadband video distribution discussed in Part I. 
Although the FCC is given a broad jurisdictional grant, the substantive 
provisions of the Communications Act demarcate the FCC’s express 
authority over the various components of the communications system.180  
The Communications Act confers upon the FCC specific authority over 
three substantive areas:  common carrier services, including wireline 
telephone networks under Title II;181 radio, including broadcast television 
and cellular telephone networks under Title III;182 and cable services under 
Title VI.183  Instead of grounding broadband regulation in any of these 
express provisions, the Commission tethered its broadband authority to its 
“ancillary jurisdiction” under the general provisions of Title I of the 
Communications Act.184  Three Supreme Court decisions carved out the 
contours of this ancillary authority:  United States v. Southwestern Cable 
Co.;185 United States v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest I);186 and FCC v. 
Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest II).187
Southwestern Cable, like the other two foundational cases associated 
with ancillary jurisdiction, was decided prior to the addition of “cable 
services” regulations to the Communications Act.
 
188
 
 178. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (2006); see also Comcast, 600 F.3d at 646–47 (“Comcast 
concedes that . . . the company’s Internet service qualifies as ‘interstate and foreign 
communication by wire’ within the meaning of Title I of the Communications Act.”). 
  In 1966, after the 
 179. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 180. See Comcast, 600 F.3d at 645. 
 181. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–276 (2006). 
 182. Id. §§ 301–399. 
 183. Id. §§ 521–573. 
 184. See supra notes 207–09 and accompanying text. 
 185. 392 U.S. 157 (1968). 
 186. 406 U.S. 649 (1972). 
 187. 440 U.S. 689 (1979). 
 188. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 646 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  Title VI, which 
gives the FCC express authority over cable services, was added in 1984. See Cable 
Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified as 
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521–573 (2006)). 
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FCC ordered community antenna television (CATV)189 providers to stop 
redistributing out-of-market broadcasts indiscriminately into local markets, 
several CATV providers petitioned for review, arguing that the FCC lacked 
authority under the Communications Act to issue the order.190  The 
Commission asserted that the regulation was necessary to protect the 
interests of local television broadcasts, over which it had express authority 
to regulate under Title III.191  The Court agreed, holding that the FCC could 
exercise jurisdiction over the CATV practice where it was “reasonably 
ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission’s various 
responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting.”192  In 
establishing this “ancillary jurisdiction,” the Southwestern Cable Court 
emphasized the congressional desire to provide the FCC with flexibility in 
its regulation of broadcasting and, referring to the broad jurisdictional 
language in Title I, stated, “We have found no reason to believe that § 152 
does not, as its terms suggest, confer regulatory authority over ‘all interstate 
. . . communication by wire or radio.’”193  Midwest I continued 
Southwestern Cable’s use of Title I where such authority was “reasonably 
ancillary” to the FCC’s express responsibilities.194  A plurality of the Court 
determined that the FCC had authority to require cable providers to create 
new programs for transmission alongside the broadcast stations they 
retransmitted.195  However, in Midwest II, the Court rejected the FCC’s use 
of ancillary jurisdiction, striking down an order requiring cable systems to 
provide public access to a requisite number of channels.196  The Midwest II 
Court limited the scope of the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction, stating that the 
Southwestern Cable doctrine “confer[s] on the Commission a circumscribed 
range of power to regulate cable television.”197
This line of ancillary jurisdiction cases became critical for the question of 
broadband regulation.  In assessing how to classify cable broadband 
service, the FCC lacked statutory direction, as the Communications Act 
does not expressly govern broadband.
  
198  The 1996 Act gave the FCC a 
choice between “telecommunications service”199 and “information 
service”200 for the classification of broadband cable modem service.201
 
 189. CATV networks were the forerunners of modern cable systems. See Comcast, 600 
F.3d at 646. 
  The 
 190. Sw. Cable, 392 U.S. at 160–61. 
 191. Id. at 165. 
 192. Id. at 178. 
 193. Id. at 173 (alteration in original). 
 194. 406 U.S. 649, 651 (1972). 
 195. Id. at 670. 
 196. 440 U.S. 689, 708–09 (1979). 
 197. Id. at 696. 
 198. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2010); NUECHTERLEIN & 
WEISER, supra note 15, at 162–64. 
 199. 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (2006). 
 200. Id. § 153(20). 
 201. In its classification proceeding, the FCC also considered whether to classify cable 
broadband as a “cable service” under Title VI.  However, the Commission dispensed with 
this option, in part because the Communications Act defines “cable service” as a “one-way 
transmission to subscribers,” while Internet activity necessarily involves a two-way 
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choice was significant because the Communications Act provides that, 
while information services are generally unregulated, telecommunications 
services hold themselves out to consumers as common carriers.202  
Common carriers—principally associated with local telephone 
monopolies203—are subject to mandatory regulation under Title II, and 
must, among other things, charge just and reasonable rates204 that are 
nondiscriminatory,205 and allow competitors to interconnect to their 
networks.206
In 2002, the Commission ruled that broadband cable modem service 
should be classified as an information service under the Communications 
Act (Cable Modem Order).
 
207  The FCC was explicit in its deregulatory 
motivation, stating that “‘broadband services should exist in a minimal 
regulatory environment that promotes investment and innovation in a 
competitive market.’”208  The ruling meant that any authority the FCC 
exercised over cable broadband would be pursuant to its Title I ancillary 
jurisdiction.209  A number of parties challenged the FCC’s classification of 
broadband, and the issue reached the Supreme Court in National Cable & 
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services.210  The Court 
affirmed the Commission’s classification, holding that “the Commission’s 
construction was ‘a reasonable policy choice for the [Commission] to 
make.’”211  The Court’s reasoning was grounded in the deferential standard 
it had adopted in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.212
The plaintiffs urged that the FCC’s determination that cable broadband 
constituted an information service was unreasonable in that it contradicted 
the Commission’s 1998 conclusion that high-speed DSL service was a 
 
 
interaction. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable & Other 
Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4836–37 (2002) [hereinafter Cable Modem Order] (quoting 47 
U.S.C. § 522(6)(A) (2006)). 
 202. 47 U.S.C. § 153(44); see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Assoc. v. Brand X Internet 
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 975–76 (2005). 
 203. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 23. 
 204. 47 U.S.C. § 201(b). 
 205. Id. § 202(a). 
 206. Id. § 251(a)(1). 
 207. Cable Modem Order, supra note 201, at 4802. 
 208. Id. (quoting Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over 
Wireline Facilities, Universal Serv. Obligations of Broadband Providers, 17 FCC Rcd. 3019, 
3022 (2002)). 
 209. Id. at 4801–02. 
 210. 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 211. Id. at 997. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 845 (1984) (alteration in original)). 
 212. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  In Chevron, the Court held that, where statutory language is 
ambiguous, a reviewing court asks only whether the agency construction was permissible, 
and does not overturn the agency determination even if the court would interpret the statute 
differently. Id. at 843 & n.11.  The Court reasoned that, because an agency’s work often 
involves questions of policy that the political branches delegate to it, the agency is more 
suited to perform the interpretive function—and more accountable to the political process—
than are the courts. Id. at 865–66. 
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common carrier service governed under Title II.213  The Brand X Court 
rejected this argument, noting first that the FCC was considering 
reclassifying DSL as an information service,214 and concluding “that the 
Commission provided a reasoned explanation for treating cable modem 
service differently from DSL service” in light of the FCC’s analysis of 
changed market circumstances.215
Notably, in several instances in dicta, the Brand X Court appeared to 
confirm that the Commission possessed Title I ancillary authority over 
broadband.  In discussing the statutory distinctions between 
telecommunications services and information services in the 1996 Act, the 
Court wrote that “[i]nformation-service providers, by contrast, are not 
subject to mandatory common-carrier regulation under Title II, though the 
Commission has jurisdiction to impose additional regulatory obligations 
under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction to regulate interstate and foreign 
communications.”
 
216
Shortly after the Brand X decision, the FCC reclassified DSL service as 
an information service in its Wireline Broadband Order,
 
217 a decision that 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in Time Warner 
Telecom, Inc. v. FCC.218  Subsequently, the Commission extended 
information service classification to broadband service over power lines219 
and wireless networks.220  Through these classification decisions, the FCC 
established a deregulatory regime with respect to its authority over 
broadband.  As the FCC stated in the Wireline Broadband Order, “[t]his 
framework establishes a minimal regulatory environment for wireline 
broadband Internet access services to benefit American consumers and 
promote innovative and efficient communications.”221
Despite the deregulatory posture of its classification orders, the FCC 
asserted its regulatory authority over the Internet in September 2005 with its 
 
 
 213. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1000–01; see also Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering 
Advanced Telecomms., 13 FCC Rcd. 24,011, 24,029–31 (1998) (defining DSL service as a 
“telecommunications service”). 
 214. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1002 (citing Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to 
the Internet Over Wireline Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 3019, 3030 (2002) (notice of proposed 
rulemaking)). 
 215. Id. at 1000–01. 
 216. Id. at 976; see also id. at 996 (“[T]he Commission remains free to impose special 
regulatory duties on facilities-based ISPs under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction.”). 
 217. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline 
Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,853, 14,856 (2005) [hereinafter Wireline Broadband Order] (rep. 
and order & notice of proposed rulemaking). 
 218. 507 F.3d 205, 208 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 219. United Power Line Council’s Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding the 
Classification of Broadband Over Power Line Internet Access Serv. as an Info. Serv., 21 
FCC Rcd. 13,281, 13,281 (2006) (mem. op. and order). 
 220. Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over 
Wireless Networks, 22 FCC Rcd. 5901, 5901 (2007) (declaratory ruling). 
 221. Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 217, at 14,855. 
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Internet Policy Statement,222 released on the same day as the FCC ordered 
the reclassification of DSL as an information service.223  The Internet 
Policy Statement articulated four principles that would guide the 
Commission in its approach to Internet activity.224  These principles 
provide that consumers using the Internet should be entitled to access legal 
content of their choosing, to run applications and use services of their 
choice, to connect devices to the network, and to enjoy competition among 
network, application, and service providers.225  The Internet Policy 
Statement incorporates the FCC’s classification decisions and its reliance 
on its Title I ancillary authority.226  In particular, the FCC relied on the 
Brand X dicta discussed above, asserting that the Commission “‘has 
jurisdiction to impose additional regulatory obligations under its Title I 
ancillary jurisdiction to regulate interstate and foreign 
communications.’”227  In the Internet Policy Statement, the Commission 
hinged its ancillary authority as governed by the Southwestern Cable 
standard on two policy provisions embedded in the Communications 
Act.228  Section 230(b) of the Communications Act states that “[i]t is the 
policy of the United States . . . to promote the continued development of the 
Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive 
media.”229  Further, Section 706(a) of the 1996 Act provides that the 
“Commission . . . shall encourage the deployment on a reasonable and 
timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all 
Americans.”230  The FCC asserted that the Internet Policy Statement was 
not an enforceable set of rules, but a group of principles that would guide 
the FCC in its approach to Internet practices.231
In addition to the Internet Policy Statement, the FCC indicated its intent 
to oversee broadband practices in October 2009 when it adopted a Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (2009 NPRM) with respect to “preserving the open 
Internet.”
 
232
 
 222. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline 
Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,986 (2005) [hereinafter Internet Policy Statement] (policy 
statement). 
  In the 2009 NPRM, the FCC sought comment on whether it 
 223. See id. at 14,986; Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 217, at 14,853. 
 224. Internet Policy Statement, supra note 222, at 14,988. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 14,987–88. 
 227. Id. (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Assoc. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 
967, 976 (2005)). 
 228. Id. at 14,987. 
 229. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2006).  Section 230 was added to the Communications Act as 
part of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 
133, 137–39.  Section 230 was codified in order to give providers and users of interactive 
services immunity both from publishing harmful content provided by others and from taking 
steps to restrict access to such content.  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)–(2). 
 230. 47 U.S.C. § 157 note (1996) (Advanced Telecommunications Incentives). 
 231. Internet Policy Statement, supra note 222, at 14,988 & n.15. 
 232. Preserving the Open Internet, 24 FCC Rcd. 13,064 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 NPRM].  
Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, the FCC promulgates notices of proposed 
rulemaking, allowing for notice to, and comment from, interested parties prior to the 
adoption of Commission rules. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2006). 
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should codify into rules the four principles enunciated in the Internet Policy 
Statement.233  The Commission also proposed two additional rules.  The 
first would impose “nondiscrimination” on broadband providers, meaning 
that they would not be able to enter into agreements with content or 
applications providers to prioritize certain network traffic.234  Second, the 
FCC proposed a rule of “transparency,” which would require broadband 
providers to disclose their network management practices to users.235  The 
FCC also sought comment on whether it should proceed against violations 
of the principles contained in the Internet Policy Statement on a case-by-
case basis, as opposed to enacting prophylactic rules.236
2.  Comcast Corp. v. FCC and Its Aftermath 
 
The FCC’s first foray into enforcing the broadband policies delineated in 
the Internet Policy Statement occurred, oddly enough, prior to the adoption 
of the Internet Policy Statement.  In 2005, the Commission entered into a 
consent decree with Madison River Communications (Madison River).237  
There, Madison River, a local telephone company that also provided 
broadband service, agreed to discontinue its practice of blocking access to 
voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) service,238 which Madison River 
viewed as a competitor to its local telephone operations.239  Although the 
actions concerned practices involving Madison River’s broadband network, 
the FCC grounded the ruling not in its ancillary jurisdiction, but in the 
common carrier provisions of Title II of the Communications Act.240  
Despite this, the Commission used the Madison River consent decree as a 
basis for its authority to adopt the Internet Policy Statement.241
In 2007, the Associated Press discovered that Comcast was interfering 
with its broadband customers’ use of peer-to-peer networks, including 
BitTorrent.
 
242  A public interest organization filed a complaint with the 
FCC, asking the Commission to enforce its Internet Policy Statement and to 
stop Comcast from engaging in these practices. 243  The FCC obliged and in 
August 2008 ordered Comcast to cease and desist its actions against peer-
to-peer networks by the end of 2008, and to provide the FCC with details of 
its revised network management practices.244
 
 233. 2009 NPRM, supra note 
  Comcast complied with the 
232, at 13,101. 
 234. Id. at 13,104–08. 
 235. Id. at 13,108–11. 
 236. Id. at 13,067–68. 
 237. Madison River Commc’ns, LLC, 20 FCC Rcd. 4295 (2005) [hereinafter Madison 
River]. 
 238. VoIP is an Internet-based application that allows customers to place telephone calls 
over broadband networks. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 191–93. 
 239. Madison River, supra note 237, at 4296. 
 240. See id. 
 241. Internet Policy Statement, supra note 222, at 14,988 n.12. 
 242. Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for 
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 13,028, 13,031 (2008) (mem. 
op. and order). 
 243. Id. at 13,032. 
 244. Id. at 13,028. 
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FCC’s requirements, but nevertheless petitioned the D.C. Circuit for 
review.245  Comcast challenged the FCC’s order on three grounds:  (1) the 
FCC lacked jurisdiction over Comcast’s broadband network management 
practices, (2) the Commission circumvented the appropriate rulemaking 
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, and (3) the order was 
arbitrary and capricious.246  The D.C. Circuit ruled only with respect to the 
jurisdictional question.247  The court vacated the order against Comcast, 
holding that the FCC had failed to establish proper ancillary jurisdiction to 
intervene in the underlying dispute.248
In so deciding, the D.C. Circuit rejected a host of arguments that the FCC 
advanced in support of its jurisdiction.  The court recognized that the 
continuing viability of the Cable Modem Order meant that jurisdiction 
could only be based on the FCC’s ancillary authority.
 
249  However, the 
court concluded that the sections of the Communications Act that the FCC 
had relied upon in adopting the Internet Policy Statement were inadequate 
to confer ancillary jurisdiction.250  The FCC argued that Sections 1 and 
230(b) of the Communications Act established congressional policy that 
gave the FCC authority to regulate with respect to broadband, but the D.C. 
Circuit rejected this policy-based approach to the Commission’s Title I 
authority, concluding that “statements of policy, by themselves, do not 
create ‘statutorily mandated responsibilities.’”251
In addition to rejecting the FCC’s substantive approach to ancillary 
jurisdiction, the court dealt the Commission a significant procedural blow.  
The FCC argued that the Supreme Court’s dicta in Brand X, which had 
seemingly confirmed the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction over broadband,
 
252 
should be dispositive of its authority to issue the Comcast Order.  The D.C. 
Circuit rejected this argument, but went beyond a finding that Brand X was 
not controlling.253  In distilling the scope of the FCC’s ancillary authority 
through an analysis of the Supreme Court rulings in Southwestern Cable, 
Midwest I, and Midwest II,254 the D.C. Circuit determined that those cases 
stood for the proposition that each assertion of Title I power needed to be 
justified separately.255  Accordingly, even if the Brand X dicta controlled 
with respect to the particular network management practices at issue in 
Brand X, it was not subject to any weight in the proceeding against 
Comcast because “the Commission must defend its exercise of ancillary 
authority on a case-by-case basis.”256
 
 245. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 661. 
 249. Id. at 645–46. 
 250. Id. at 644. 
 251. Id. (quoting Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). 
 252. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
 253. Comcast, 600 F.3d at 649–51. 
 254. See supra notes 185–97. 
 255. Comcast, 600 F.3d at 651. 
 256. Id. 
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The Comcast decision brought an abrupt halt to the FCC’s new 
regulatory regime for the Internet, with the Commission itself 
acknowledging that the ruling cast doubt upon its ability to further enforce 
the Internet Policy Statement.257  Although it recognized that the Comcast 
decision invalidated the particular ancillary jurisdiction approach it had 
attempted to exercise, the FCC asserted that the “[D.C. Circuit] in no way 
disagreed with the importance of preserving a free and open Internet; nor 
did it close the door to other methods for achieving this important end.”258  
For its part, Comcast claimed that it fully supported the principles espoused 
in the Internet Policy Statement, and that its petition before the D.C. Circuit 
was intended merely to clear its name.259
On May 6, 2010, one month after the Comcast ruling, FCC Chairman 
Julius Genachowski announced the Commission’s intent to reassert its 
jurisdiction over broadband, outlining three potential avenues for the 
Commission to proceed, including the possibility of reclassifying 
broadband service as a telecommunications service under Title II.
 
260  The 
FCC’s goal, said Genachowski, was to determine “the best method for 
restoring the shared understanding of FCC authority that existed before the 
Comcast decision.”261  On June 17, 2010, the FCC adopted a formal notice 
of inquiry that sought public comment regarding the broadband 
reclassification question.262  However, on December 21, 2010, the 
Commission officially marked a departure from broadband reclassification, 
and issued a report and order (Net Neutrality Order) that established formal 
rules governing broadband provider practices.263  The Net Neutrality Order 
codified three “prophylactic”264 rules governing broadband provider 
activity that were culled from the rules outlined in the 2009 NPRM265:  (1) 
a “transparency” rule requiring broadband providers to disclose their 
network management practices; (2) a ban on the blocking of legal content, 
applications, and services by fixed (i.e., non-wireless) providers; and (3) a 
modified version of the non-discrimination policy proposed in the 2009 
NPRM, also applicable only to fixed broadband providers.266  The last two 
rules are subject to exceptions for broadband providers’ “reasonable 
network management,” the determination of which will be subject to case-
by-case adjudications.267
 
 257. See Genachowski, supra note 
  The non-discrimination rule adopted in the Net 
9, at 3–4. 
 258. Advisory, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Statement on Comcast v. FCC, (Apr. 6, 
2010), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-297355A1.pdf. 
 259. Press Release, Comcast Corp., Comcast Statement on U.S. Court of Appeals 
Decision on Comcast v. FCC (Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.comcast.com/About/PressRelease/ 
PressReleaseDetail.ashx?PRID=984. 
 260. See Genachowski, supra note 9, at 3–6. 
 261. Id. at 6. 
 262. Framework for Broadband Internet Serv., 25 FCC Rcd. 7866 (2010) (notice of 
inquiry). 
 263. Net Neutrality Order, supra note 176. 
 264. Id. at 3. 
 265. See supra notes 232–36 and accompanying text. 
 266. Net Neutrality Order, supra note 176, at 2. 
 267. Id. at 24, 82. 
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Neutrality Order diverged from the rule proposed in the 2009 NPRM in 
that, instead of a flat ban on discriminatory practices, the FCC’s latest rule 
bars only “unreasonable discrimination.”268  However, although the FCC 
did not affirmatively rule out commercial arrangements between broadband 
providers and online services to prioritize particular network traffic—
agreements that lie at the core of concerns regarding Comcast’s ability to 
leverage NBCU content through broadband services such as TV 
Everywhere269—the Commission made it clear that these agreements would 
be subject to heightened scrutiny, and likely disallowed.270
In adopting the Net Neutrality Order, the FCC again asserted its ancillary 
authority to promulgate the rules, justifying its jurisdiction over broadband 
as a necessary exercise of its Title I power to effectuate a host of provisions 
in Titles II, III, and VI of the Communications Act, as well as on the policy-
based authority in Section 230(b) of the Communications Act and Section 
706(a) of the 1996 Act that it had used to promulgate the Internet Policy 
Statement.
 
271  As to enforcement, the FCC adopted mechanisms for 
informal and formal complaints by “any person,” in addition to a complaint 
process that could be initiated by the Commission.272
The Net Neutrality Order, although adopted by a majority of the FCC, 
certainly is not the final statement on the question of the FCC’s authority to 
regulate broadband.  Dissenting Commissioner Robert McDowell predicted 
that courts would overturn the Net Neutrality Order on jurisdictional 
grounds as the D.C. Circuit had in Comcast.
 
273  Indeed, shortly after the 
rules were announced, Verizon challenged the FCC’s authority to 
promulgate them, seeking appeal before the same three judges in the D.C. 
Circuit that had ruled against the Commission in Comcast.274  The D.C. 
Circuit dismissed the Verizon lawsuit in April 2011 because the company 
had appealed prior to publication of the rules in the Federal Register, but 
Verizon expressed its intent to re-file once such publication occurs.275
Shortly after the FCC adopted the new rules, congressional Republicans 
promised to introduce resolutions that would curtail the FCC’s ability to 
implement the Net Neutrality Order.
 
276
 
 268. Id. at 24. 
  The first attack along these lines 
occurred in February 2011, when the House of Representatives voted to 
 269. See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text. 
 270. Net Neutrality Order, supra note 176, at 43–44. 
 271. Id. at 62–77, 87; see also supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
 272. Net Neutrality Order, supra note 176, at 82–85. 
 273. Id. at 148–50 (McDowell, Comm’r, dissenting). 
 274. Juliana Gruenwald, Verizon Files Appeal of FCC Net Neutrality Order, NAT’L J. 
TECH DAILY DOSE (Jan. 20, 2011, 4:17 PM), http://techdailydose.nationaljournal.com/2011/ 
01/verizon-files-appeal-of-fcc-ne.php; Ryan Singel, Verizon Files Suit Against FCC Net 
Neutrality Rules, WIRED EPICENTER (Jan. 20, 2011, 5:26 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2011/01/verizon-sues-fcc. 
 275. See Amy Schatz, Internet-Rule Suits Rejected by Appeals Court, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 
2011, at B11. 
 276. See David Hatch et al., FCC’s Split Vote on Network-Neutrality Rules Only Inflames 
Debate, NAT’L J. (Dec. 21, 2010, 7:00 PM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/fcc-s-split-vote-
on-network-neutrality-rules-only-inflames-debate-20101221. 
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defund any FCC allotments that would be utilized to implement the 
provisions of the Net Neutrality Order,277 a resolution that the Senate 
subsequently rejected.278  In March 2011, the House Subcommittee on 
Communications and Technology voted a bill up to the full House Energy 
and Commerce Committee that would invalidate the Net Neutrality 
Order,279 a resolution that the full House passed a month later.280  The bill 
faces considerable hurdles, as it would need to be approved by the Senate 
and President Barack Obama before the Net Neutrality Order could be 
overturned.281
B.  Antitrust Oversight of Telecommunications and Media Industries 
  Nevertheless, even if these actions only amount to political 
posturing, they illustrate that the Net Neutrality Order is merely the most 
recent point of contention in the expanding argument over the proper 
method of oversight of broadband practices. 
Although their interaction with broadband has not been as substantial as 
the FCC’s, the DOJ and the FTC have a considerable history of overseeing 
competitive issues in the telecommunications and media sectors.  These 
agencies, which conduct reviews on a case-by-case basis and focus almost 
entirely on the competitive effects of market practices,282 have been 
proffered as the principal alternatives to the FCC in supervising broadband-
related issues.283
1.  Department of Justice 
  This section outlines the relevant history of the DOJ and 
the FTC with respect to broadband and telecommunications, and discusses 
the jurisdictional authority issues facing an antitrust broadband video 
oversight regime. 
a.  AT&T Consent Decree 
The most prominent telecommunications oversight action of the past 
half-century was the consent decree entered into between the DOJ and 
AT&T, which resulted in the divestiture of local telephone monopolies—
 
 277. Cecilia Kang, House Votes To Stop FCC Funding for Net Neutrality, WASH. POST 
POST TECH. (Feb. 17, 2011, 7:05 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2011/02/ 
house_votes_to_stop_funds_for.html. 
 278. John Eggerton, Senate Rejects House CR with FCC, CPB Cuts, BROAD. & CABLE 
(Mar. 9, 2011, 6:32 PM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/465034-
Senate_Rejects_House_CR_with_FCC_CPB_Cuts.php. 
 279. Cecilia Kang, House Panel Votes To Invalidate Net Neutrality Rules, WASH. POST 
POST TECH. (Mar. 9, 2011, 5:49 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2011/03/ 
house_panel_votes_to_invalidat.html. 
 280. Cecilia Kang, House Approves Measure To Overturn FCC Net Neutrality Rules, 
WASH. POST POST TECH. (Apr. 08, 2011, 5:15 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ 
post-tech/post/house-approves-measure-to-overturn-fcc-net-neutrality-rules/2011/04/08/ 
AFBQCc3C_blog.html. 
 281. Id. 
 282. See James R. Weiss & Martin L. Stern, Serving Two Masters:  The Dual Jurisdiction 
of the FCC and the Justice Department over Telecommunications Transactions, 6 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 195, 195, 197 (1998). 
 283. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
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called regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs)—from the corporate 
AT&T parent,284 a case in which antitrust oversight took precedence over 
continued FCC regulation.  There, the DOJ convinced Judge Harold Greene 
that the FCC was incapable of effective regulatory enforcement over 
AT&T’s monopoly in local and long-distance telephone service.285  In 
addition to the divestiture of AT&T’s local telephone business, the consent 
decree placed line-of-business restrictions upon the newly created RBOCs.  
First, the RBOCs were prohibited from engaging in telecommunications 
equipment manufacturing, addressing concerns that the RBOCs could 
leverage equipment prices to boost profits where they could not have done 
so under local telephone rate regulations.286  Another important restriction 
in the decree precluded RBOCs from entering the long-distance market 
unless they convinced the DOJ that doing so would not be an 
anticompetitive act.287
After the consent decree took effect in 1984, Judge Greene presided over 
the DOJ’s enforcement of the decree until passage of the 1996 Act.
 
288  
Indeed, one purpose of the 1996 Act, which directly abolished the AT&T 
consent decree,289 was to eliminate the control that Judge Greene held over 
the telecommunications industry.290
b.  Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP 
and the Future of Antitrust Oversight of Telecommunications and Media 
Industries 
 
While the DOJ dominated the regulation of the telecommunications 
industry in the years following the AT&T divestiture, the continued reliance 
on antitrust authorities to administer competition policy in this sector has 
been called into question both by provisions of the 1996 Act and by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices 
of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP.291  As noted above, the 1996 Act specifically 
eliminated further enforcement of the AT&T consent decree, replacing this 
with a series of competition policies subject to FCC enforcement.292
 
 284. See United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub 
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). 
  In 
addition, the 1996 Act eliminated many of the line-of-business restrictions 
that had been imposed under the consent decree, including RBOC entry into 
 285. Id. at 168; see also NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 417. 
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 287. Id. at 62. 
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the long distance and equipment manufacturing business.293  The regulatory 
provisions in the 1996 Act specifically directed the FCC to oversee many of 
the antitrust-like concerns that had been handled by the DOJ and Judge 
Greene during the dozen years of enforcement of the AT&T consent 
decree.294  Although these provisions suggest that Congress placed 
oversight of telecommunications firmly in the hands of the FCC, the 1996 
Act also includes an antitrust savings clause (Savings Clause) that, aside 
from the elimination of consent decrees, purports to maintain the status quo 
with respect to antitrust law.295
In Trinko, the Supreme Court cast further doubt upon the continued 
reliance on antitrust law to enforce competition in the telecommunications 
industry.  There, AT&T customers within Verizon’s monopolized New 
York City local telephone market brought an antitrust action against 
Verizon under Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, alleging that 
Verizon had failed to properly connect its network to competitive entrants, 
including AT&T.
 
296  Prior to this private antitrust action, Verizon had 
entered into a consent decree with the FCC that forced Verizon to better 
conform to requirements that it interconnect its wireline facilities to 
competitive local operators in exchange for the right to enter the long 
distance business.297  First, the Court concluded that the alleged activity did 
not raise a claim under section 2.298  The Court proceeded to determine that 
antitrust remedies generally would be limited in the situation presented 
because, where there exists “a regulatory structure designed to deter and 
remedy anticompetitive harm,” then “the additional benefit to competition 
provided by antitrust enforcement will tend to be small.”299  The Court 
found that the regulatory scheme enacted by the 1996 Act was one that 
likely would preclude the existence of any separate antitrust harm.300
The fallout from Trinko remains uncertain, as there are various 
interpretations of the Court’s seeming rejection of antitrust intervention into 
regulated industries.
 
301
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1457–58 (1999). 
  But at the minimum, it appears that Trinko 
reflected the continued rise of FCC enforcement over telecommunications 
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earlier advanced by the 1996 Act.302  However, despite the 1996 Act and 
the Trinko decision, it is not certain that FCC regulation would supersede 
antitrust jurisdiction over broadband.  The Trinko Court specifically 
characterized antitrust enforcement as unnecessary in regulated industries 
that have defined structures for preventing competitive harm.303  Because 
the status of broadband as a regulated industry remains a part of the central 
debate of its governance following Comcast, even a broad reading of Trinko 
may not foreclose antitrust oversight of broadband practices.304
2.  Federal Trade Commission 
 
The FTC’s engagement with broadband has been more direct than the 
DOJ’s.  After a yearlong inquiry into the broadband marketplace, the FTC 
released a report (FTC Staff Report) in 2007, addressing the need for the 
agency to enforce competition policy in the sector.305  The FTC Staff 
Report adopts a deregulatory approach to broadband, noting that the 
industry is “young and dynamic” and that the FTC had not identified any 
instances of market failure in the broadband market.306  Specifically, the 
FTC Staff Report warned against hasty regulatory intervention in an effort 
to prevent prospective harms.307  Despite concluding that action was 
unnecessary—and indicating that regulatory action might indeed have 
adverse effects on consumers—the FTC indicated that it would continue to 
work to promote broadband access.308
The FTC, like the FCC and the DOJ, also lacks clearly defined 
jurisdiction over broadband practices.  Under the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (FTC Act), the FTC is precluded from enforcing unfair 
competition laws against “common carriers.”
 
309  As a result, the FTC has 
not played a significant role in federal oversight of the telecommunications 
industry.310  However, as discussed above, the Brand X Court affirmed the 
FCC’s decision to classify broadband as an information service under the 
Communications Act.311
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jurisdiction over broadband in the Brand X ruling, arguing that, as 
broadband services are not common carriers, the exemption in the FTC Act 
does not apply.312  The question as to whether the FTC possesses 
jurisdiction over broadband under the FTC Act is therefore uncertain.313
C.  Dual Agency Review of Telecommunications Mergers 
 
The passage of the 1996 Act ushered in a wave of telecommunications 
mergers.314  Comcast’s acquisition of NBCU discussed above is just the 
latest in a decade-long trend of vast consolidation in the 
telecommunications and media industries.315
1.  Antitrust Review Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements 
Act 
  In almost all instances, both 
the antitrust authorities—either the DOJ or the FTC—and the FCC 
concurrently review major mergers in this sector.  As the discussion above 
illustrates, the FCC, DOJ, and FTC each face significant jurisdictional 
questions in connection with continued oversight of broadband.  However, 
over the past decade, these agencies have made a number of determinations 
with respect to telecommunications and media mergers that elucidate their 
respective approach to broadband practices. 
The DOJ and the FTC principally review mergers under Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act,316 which bars any merger or acquisition whose consummation 
may be “substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a 
monopoly.”317  Under the Clayton Act, the DOJ and the FTC possess 
concurrent jurisdiction over mergers and acquisitions.318  However, as 
discussed above, the FTC does not have jurisdiction over common 
carriers.319  Accordingly, the DOJ conducts antitrust review of the majority 
of mergers in the telecommunications sector.320
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common carrier is not involved, the DOJ and the FTC conduct a clearance 
process to determine which agency will oversee the review.321
The manner in which the antitrust authorities handle merger review 
changed with the passage of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements 
Act of 1976
 
322 (HSR Act).  The HSR Act establishes a premerger 
notification process, requiring the merging parties to serve notice upon the 
reviewing agency and await review prior to consummating the merger.323  
The antitrust authorities assess the merits of these mergers pursuant to 
jointly crafted Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which were updated in 
2010.324  After review, if the antitrust agency believes that the proposed 
merger will result in anticompetitive activity, it bears the burden of 
establishing a section 7 violation before a federal district court.325  Merger 
reviews are often settled through consent decrees whereby the merging 
parties agree to conditions to the merger in order to gain antitrust 
approval.326  Under DOJ guidelines, where the agency extracts such 
conditions from merging parties, “[t]here must be a significant nexus 
between the proposed transaction, the nature of the competitive harm, and 
the proposed remedial provisions.”327
2.  FCC Review Under the Communications Act 
 
Under the Clayton Act, the FCC possesses concurrent review authority of 
telecommunications mergers with the antitrust authorities.328  However, the 
FCC generally reviews mergers under the Communications Act,329 an 
authority that stems from the transfer of common carrier or broadcast 
licenses as part of the merger, which the FCC must find are transferred in 
the “public interest.”330  As a result of this requirement, the merging parties 
have the burden of convincing the FCC that the merger should be 
approved.331  FCC merger reviews often result in “voluntary” conditions 
being imposed on the merging parties, a result that is shielded from judicial 
review.332
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There has been considerable criticism leveled at the FCC in connection 
with its merger review process.333  Typically, this criticism focuses on the 
length of time that the FCC takes to conduct its reviews, the extent to which 
the conditions it places on the parties are unrelated to the merger, and the 
lack of clearly defined review standards.334  However, despite attempts for 
significant reform or repeal of the FCC’s authority in this regard, the 
Commission continues to assert itself in this arena.335
3.  Recent Telecommunications and Media Mergers 
 
Several of the most significant mergers in the past decade have 
reformulated portions of the former AT&T monopoly and, despite stiff 
public opposition, have been approved both by the DOJ and the FCC.336  In 
2005, SBC Communications, a RBOC created as part of the AT&T 
divestiture, acquired its former corporate parent, AT&T.337  In a similar 
acquisition that same year, Verizon, another RBOC, merged with MCI, 
formerly a major competitor to AT&T in the long distance market.338  In its 
review under the HSR Act, the DOJ, concerned that the merged entities 
would unduly consolidate specialized broadband services, forced both 
merging groups to divest specific fiber optic channels to competitors.339  
The FCC, meanwhile, forced the merging companies to agree to adhere to 
the terms of the Internet Policy Statement following the merger.340  When 
the newly merged AT&T acquired RBOC BellSouth in 2007, the DOJ 
imposed no conditions on the merger,341 while the FCC again required, 
among other things, that the merged entity abide by the Internet Policy 
Statement for thirty months following the merger.342
In addition to these telecommunications mergers, several reviews of 
mergers between media firms demonstrate how the various agencies have 
approached the competitive ramifications of these alignments.  In a 1996 
merger involving Time Warner and Turner Broadcasting, the FTC forced 
Time Warner to carry alternative news channels on its cable systems, in 
 
 
 333. See generally Rachel E. Barkow & Peter W. Huber, A Tale of Two Agencies:  A 
Comparative Analysis of FCC and DOJ Review of Telecommunications Mergers, 2000 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 29. 
 334. See Philip J. Weiser, Reexamining the Legacy of Dual Regulation:  Reforming Dual 
Merger Review by the DOJ and the FCC, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 167, 168–69 (2008) 
(summarizing critiques of FCC merger review). 
 335. See Harold Feld, The Need for FCC Merger Review, 18 COMM. LAW. 20, 20 (2000) 
(discussing instances where Congress considered eliminating, but ultimately left intact, FCC 
merger review authority). 
 336. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at xvi. 
 337. SBC Commc’ns Inc. & AT&T Corp. Applications for Approval of Transfer of 
Control, 20 FCC Rcd. 18,290 (2005) [hereinafter SBC-AT&T Order] (mem. op. and order). 
 338. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. & MCI, Inc., Applications for Approval of Transfer of 
Control, 20 FCC Rcd. 18,433 (2005) [hereinafter Verizon-MCI Order] (mem. op. and order). 
 339. See United States v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6–7 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 340. See SBC-AT&T Order, supra note 337, at 18,368, 18,414; Verizon-MCI Order, 
supra note 338, at 18,509, 18,561; see also supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 341. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at xvii & n.2. 
 342. AT&T Inc. & BellSouth Corp. Application for Transfer of Control, 22 FCC Rcd. 
5662, 5814–16 (2007) (mem. op. and order). 
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addition to Turner-owned CNN.343  The FTC also reviewed the 1999 
merger between AOL and Time Warner and, as an approval condition, 
required the merged entity to provide open access to its cable service 
facilities in order to accommodate rival broadband providers.344  The FCC, 
on the other hand, required AOL to allow competitors to interconnect to its 
dominant instant messenger service.345  The FCC’s requirement has been 
criticized as an example of the Commission’s failure to engage in 
appropriate decision making with respect to its merger review authority.346  
Perhaps confirming this criticism, the FCC decided to repeal the instant 
messenger interconnection requirement two years after approving the AOL-
Time Warner merger.347
The Comcast-NBCU merger discussed in Part I.D.1 represents the latest 
in this line of dual FCC and antitrust reviews.  In a coordinated effort, the 
FCC and the DOJ imposed conditions upon the merger that aggressively 
address potential conflicts in the market for broadband video 
distribution.
 
348  The conditions imposed give validation to the rise of 
broadband video distributors, as online distributors will have the same 
ability to bargain for bundled packages of NBCU content from Comcast as 
will traditional MVPDs.349  Comcast will be required to offer NBCU 
content to online distributors who enter into comparable content agreements 
with NBCU’s content producer peers.350  Comcast must take measures to 
ensure that NBCU content is available online,351 and must also agree to the 
nondiscrimination rule contained in the Net Neutrality Order.352  Notably, 
Comcast agreed to adhere to many of the conditions for seven years.353
 
 343. See Time Warner Inc., FTC File No. 961-0004, at 16–17 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Sept. 
12, 1996) (decision and order), http://www.ftc.gov/os/1996/09/twconsnt.pdf. 
  
 344. See Am. Online, Inc. & Time Warner Inc., FTC Docket No. C-3989, at 11 (Fed. 
Trade Comm’n Apr. 17, 2001) (decision and order), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/04/ 
aoltwdo.pdf; NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 160–62. 
 345. Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses & Section 214 
Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. & Am. Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time Warner 
Inc., Transferee, 16 FCC Rcd. 6547, 6610–11 (2001) (mem. op. and order). 
 346. See Daniel L. Brenner, Creating Effective Broadband Network Regulation, 62 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 13, 35 (2010) (criticizing the FCC’s failure to anticipate the development of 
competitive instant messaging technology); Philip J. Weiser, Institutional Design, FCC 
Reform, and the Hidden Side of the Administrative State, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 675, 708–09 
(2009) (criticizing the FCC for the lack of nexus between the imposed instant messenger 
obligation and the merger, and for the Commission’s failure to adequately delineate its 
jurisdiction over instant messaging services). 
 347. Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses & Section 214 
Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. and Am. Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time 
Warner Inc., Transferee, 18 FCC Rcd. 16,835 (2003). 
 348. Press Release, supra note 151 (quoting the head of the DOJ Antitrust Division, 
Assistant Attorney General Christine Varney, as stating that the DOJ “worked in close 
cooperation and unprecedented coordination” with the FCC on the merger review). 
 349. Id.  The offline corollary to this requirement, the FCC’s “program access rules,” is 
discussed infra in Part III.B.3. 
 350. News, supra note 150. 
 351. Id. 
 352. Id. 
 353. See Stelter & Arango, supra note 141 (noting that the seven-year duration is “an 
unusually long period of time” for merger conditions). 
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While the conditions are expressly designed to promote the development of 
the broadband video space, there is some question as to whether having 
online distributors bargain as MVPDs will force the online space into an 
MVPD-like business model.354
III.  THE FCC AND ANTITRUST OPTIONS:  SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL 
DEBATES 
 
As Part II suggests, the assessment of any regulatory regime for the 
distribution of video content over broadband must begin with the question 
of jurisdiction.  Each of the agencies proposed as potential regulators in this 
area—the FCC, the DOJ, and the FTC—are presented with a number of 
hurdles in connection with their authority to oversee this developing 
market.  But, beyond the question of authority, the jurisdictional muddle 
following Comcast has reinvigorated the debate over whether broadband is 
best addressed through FCC regulation or antitrust oversight.355
This part outlines the ways in which these two oversight methodologies 
are likely to approach the market for broadband video distribution, with 
particular emphasis on the concerns raised in connection with the recent 
transactions discussed in Part I.D.  Part III.A discusses the debate over 
whether vertical consolidation concerns should play a role in a broadband 
video oversight regime.  Part III.B discusses debates over non-competition 
concerns in broadband markets, and the extent to which the FCC and 
antitrust authorities are equipped to address these concerns.  Part III.C 
addresses procedural paradigms of the FCC and antitrust authorities that 
likely would impact their effectiveness in addressing broadband video 
issues. 
  These 
debates center on the substantive and procedural approaches of these 
agencies in an effort to assess the relative efficacy of possible oversight 
regimes. 
A.  Vertical Leveraging, Market Power, and the Incentive To Discriminate 
In its Net Neutrality Order, one of the principal reasons the FCC gave for 
establishing prophylactic rules against the discrimination and blocking of 
broadband traffic was the incentive and ability that broadband providers 
possess to engage in these practices.356  In doing so, the FCC expressly 
addressed the conflicts that exist between online distributors such as Netflix 
and the MVPD/broadband providers such as Comcast that serve as 
thoroughfares for Netflix video traffic.357
 
 354. See Tessler, supra note 
  The Commission concluded that 
the rise of services such as Netflix, Hulu, and others will put pressure on 
broadband providers to act in anticompetitive ways against these services in 
153 (noting an analyst’s opinion that the conditions 
“shackle[] these new companies to traditional business models and inhibit[] innovation”). 
 355. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 356. See Net Neutrality Order, supra note 176, at 11. 
 357. Id. at 12–13 (arguing that “broadband providers have incentives to interfere with the 
operation of third-party Internet-based services that compete with the providers’ revenue-
generating . . . pay-television services”); see also supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
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order to make them less attractive to consumers.358  In adopting the 
blocking and non-discrimination rule, the FCC sought to preemptively 
curtail these acts, an effort that the Commission found necessary to promote 
competition and innovation in broadband.359
From the standpoint of substantive necessity, the FCC’s assumptions 
regarding broadband provider incentives and their competitive impact run 
counter to developments in modern antitrust theory, which suggests that 
exclusive vertical relationships are not necessarily harmful, and that they 
often can lead to efficient, procompetitive results.
 
360  In contrast to the 
FCC’s asserted need for ex ante action to guarantee competition in the 
market for broadband video distribution, modern antitrust analysis 
approaches vertical arrangements from the presumption that they are 
efficient.361  The starting point for an assessment of how antitrust would 
view exclusionary, vertical relationships in broadband video markets is the 
architecture of the Internet, which can be broken into four distinct layers:  
(1) content; (2) applications; (3) the logical layer, comprised of the standard 
TCP/IP protocol used to transfer data over Internet networks; and (4) the 
physical layer, composed of the transport facilities used to send data 
through the Internet.362  A key feature of this architecture is that the logical 
layer is not controlled by anyone, and is open to content and application 
developers without restriction.363  As a result, although broadband 
providers exercise a high degree of control over the physical layer, because 
the physical layer and the applications layer are distinct, application 
developers are free to create various programs, such as Netflix and Hulu, 
that use the standardized logic of the Internet to deliver content to 
consumers without authorization or payment to broadband providers.364
Although it would appear at first that broadband providers would be 
chagrined by their inability to reap rewards from the transfer of unaffiliated 
content over their networks, modern antitrust analysis suggests that 
broadband providers are instead incentivized to encourage a robust 
marketplace for applications and content because this increases the value of 
the platform, allowing broadband providers to charge consumers a higher 
 
 
 358. Net Neutrality Order, supra note 176, at 13–14. 
 359. Id. at 45–46. 
 360. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, What Can Antitrust Contribute to the Network 
Neutrality Debate?, 1 INT’L J. COMM. 493, 504–06 (2007). 
 361. Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open 
Access Policies:  Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 87 (2003) (“[C]urrent antitrust doctrine still generally presumes that 
vertical agreements, vertical extension, and vertical mergers are unobjectionable unless a 
fact-intensive investigation shows otherwise.”). 
 362. Id. at 90–91. 
 363. See id. (describing the impact of TCP/IP openness). 
 364. Id.; see also Keeping the Internet Neutral?:  Tim Wu and Christopher Yoo Debate, 
59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575, 581–82 (2007) (relaying comments from network neutrality 
proponent Tim Wu that the layered architecture promotes market entry by content and 
application providers). 
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price for broadband access.365  In addition, this analysis contends that 
platform providers are incentivized to make the most efficient decision as to 
whether to join the applications market—a decision being made by 
Comcast and other MVPDs with the TV Everywhere model366—and will 
do so only if it increases the overall value of the combined application and 
platform.367  Generally, a broadband provider is therefore encouraged to 
provide support for the unaffiliated applications running over its physical 
layer, so that it can maximize the value of its own platform.368  The 
presumption supported by this reasoning is that, where a platform 
monopolist enters into the applications market, or if it engages in 
exclusionary behavior within the applications market, it has done so only 
because it is efficient and likely to benefit consumers.369
This presumption lends support to those favoring a hands-off approach to 
the rising conflict between broadband providers and online distributors, 
insofar as the broadband provider will lack the incentive to inefficiently 
block or degrade applications because it would result in a decrease in value 
to consumers of its platform product.
 
370  However, there are several 
pertinent exceptions to the above analysis.371  The most critical for the 
broadband video marketplace is that, where the unaffiliated product at the 
applications layer threatens a core business of the platform provider, the 
platform provider might be incentivized to act inefficiently to suppress 
those applications.372  This is precisely the circumstance present in the 
broadband video marketplace—as they grow, broadband video distributors 
are becoming direct threats to broadband providers’ core MVPD 
business.373
Despite the likelihood that many broadband providers possess an 
underlying incentive to engage in discriminatory conduct toward online 
video distributors, that fact does not necessarily end the debate as to the 
need for the FCC’s prophylactic remedy, because incentive alone is 
 
 
 365. Farrell & Weiser, supra note 361, at 103 (providing models as to how a platform 
provider would benefit from unaffiliated application development). 
 366. See supra Part I.C.5. 
 367. Farrell & Weiser, supra note 361, at 103 (demonstrating how a platform provider’s 
entry into the application market would be efficient and value-enhancing). 
 368. Id. at 104. 
 369. See id. at 104–05. 
 370. See Nuechterlein, supra note 171, at 41 (suggesting that, generally, platform 
providers will not favor affiliated content in ways that harm consumers). 
 371. See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 361, at 105 (listing eight exceptions to the 
presumption that platform providers will enter the applications market only if it is efficient). 
 372. Id. at 109 & n.100 (“[C]onsider the attitude of cable providers toward streaming 
video applications over their cable modems. . . .  [C]able providers should happily endorse 
this use of their platform, as it would make the platform more valuable to users and therefore 
more profitable.  But a cable provider who allows video streaming will find it harder to 
engage in the profitable and customary price discrimination that sets high markups for 
premium cable programming.  Thus, a cable provider might rationally, but inefficiently, try 
to stop this innovative method of distribution.”); see also van Schewick, supra note 171, at 
345–46 (drawing a similar analogy to a telephone company’s incentives with respect to a 
VoIP service running over its broadband network). 
 373. See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text. 
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insufficient to exact competitive harm.  Instead, there generally needs to be 
a finding that the broadband provider possesses market power374 and an 
ability to engage in anticompetitive practices.375
One of the arguments against a determination that broadband providers 
possess market power and the ability to exert anticompetitive leveraging 
against broadband video distributors is grounded in the geographical scope 
of various Internet-related markets.
 
376  Broadband providers, even if they 
exist as a monopoly with respect to end users, can only engage in 
anticompetitive practices against an online distributor in the specified local 
area where they control the physical layer.377  Accordingly, even a large 
broadband provider such as Comcast would be able to harm Netflix only in 
a specified region, allowing Netflix to continue to reach customers in the 
rest of the country.378
In response to the above argument, those favoring the types of 
prophylactic rules that the FCC adopted in the Net Neutrality Order argue 
that the incentive and ability to engage in anticompetitive practices can be 
found in a broadband provider’s power to protect their core business 
without being injured by the exclusionary remedy of having to lose the 
customer.
 
379  Moreover, this line of argument suggests that, even assuming 
that the geographic market for content and applications is national, a 
reduction of that market by a broadband provider would lead to a decreased 
incentive to create innovative concepts at the application and content levels, 
which is itself worthy of protection.380
A further divide between proponents and opponents of prophylactic rules 
concerns the appropriate scope of competition policy.  Under antitrust 
principles, the goal of economic policy is to promote competition, without 
 
 
 374. See Howard A. Shelanski, Antitrust Law as Mass Media Regulation:  Can Merger 
Standards Protect the Public Interest?, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 371, 409 (2006) (defining “market 
power” as a firm’s “ability to raise prices, lower output levels, reduce quality, or otherwise 
indicate that it is insulated from competitive pressure”). 
 375. See Nuechterlein, supra note 171, at 34, 40; see generally James B. Speta, A 
Sensible Next Step on Network Neutrality:  The Market Power Question, 8 REV. NETWORK 
ECON. 113 (2009).  In its Net Neutrality Order, the FCC decided that it was unnecessary to 
determine whether broadband providers hold market power based on the fact that broadband 
providers possess the technical capability to block traffic in the last mile to end users. See 
Net Neutrality Order, supra note 176, at 19 & n.87. 
 376. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 360, at 513. 
 377. See Nuechterlein, supra note 171, at 40 (“[N]o broadband provider occupies a large 
enough share of the national broadband market to harm competition in the inherently 
national (and international) markets for content and applications.”). 
 378. See Yoo, supra note 360, at 513 (arguing that content and application providers are 
more concerned with the overall size of the applicable market than with their ability to reach 
consumers in a specified local area).  Yoo concludes that the broadband provider market, 
measured against the national market for content and applications, is insufficiently 
concentrated for one firm to threaten application and content providers. Id. 
 379. See Brett M. Frischmann and Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and the 
Economics of an Information Superhighway:  A Reply to Professor Yoo, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 
383, 417–18 (2007) (arguing that, because broadband services usually operate as a monopoly 
or duopoly in a given area, consumers are unlikely to switch services simply based on harm 
to one applications provider). 
 380. See id. at 418–20. 
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concerning itself with the impact that policies have on any one 
competitor.381  In the broadband context, those favoring this approach 
assert that innovation occurs both at the content and applications level and 
at the physical level of the network, and that, in the absence of harmful 
conduct, such developments should be allowed to proceed outside of 
regulation that might stifle experimentation and diversified broadband 
practices.382  The FCC diverged starkly from this perspective in the Net 
Neutrality Order, expressly advocating for a regulatory framework that 
protects innovation at the content and application layer even where 
broadband provider activity does not amount to anticompetitive harm.383  
The institutional decision in this regard may thus prove crucial, as it is 
unclear whether, given these developments in modern antitrust doctrine, the 
DOJ or the FTC would object to the blocking and discrimination practices 
that lie at the center of the Net Neutrality Order.384
B.  Beyond Economics:  Public Interest Concerns and Broadband 
 
Even as the debate rages over the appropriate economic approach to 
broadband practices, others question whether competition should be the 
primary concern in governing the relationships between broadband 
providers and application and content providers.  This section highlights 
debates regarding the applicability of non-economic concerns in the 
broadband context, and discusses recent FCC history in addressing these 
concerns in the context of media ownership regulations and program access 
rules. 
1.  The FCC’s Public Interest Standard 
As a general rule, antitrust law’s sole focus is on competition, whereas 
the FCC has a broader mandate to ensure that communications are delivered 
in the “public interest,” an inquiry that encapsulates matters such as the 
promotion of diversity and localism, as well as competition.385  
Commentators diverge as to whether these non-competitive issues are 
animated in broadband markets.  Some have suggested that concerns related 
to vertical leveraging against content and application providers are solely 
within the ambit of the market power analysis that antitrust addresses.386
 
 381. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977); 
Nuechterlein, supra note 
  
171, at 41. 
 382. See Yoo, supra note 360, at 501, 502–04. 
 383. Net Neutrality Order, supra note 176, at 45–46. 
 384. See Brenner, supra note 346, at 61 & n.185 (noting that antitrust would not 
necessarily find a competitive violation if a broadband provider were to block certain 
programming or charge fees for prioritizing third party traffic). 
 385. See Jerry Brito & Jerry Ellig, A Tale of Two Commissions:  Net Neutrality and 
Regulatory Analysis, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 33–34 (2007) (describing the different 
congressional mandates directed to the FTC and the FCC by their respective enabling 
statutes). 
 386. See Nuechterlein, supra note 171, at 37–39 (suggesting that the core concern of 
nondiscrimination is market power, and that network neutrality regulation does not address 
concerns related to issues of “free expression”); Speta, supra note 375, at 123–24. 
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Others reject the argument that market-based considerations are the only 
issues concerning broadband.  In perhaps the sharpest critique of an 
economic-only approach, Professor Susan Crawford has argued that the 
concern of most debates over blocking and discrimination of content is 
misplaced, in that its sole focus is over the control of content delivery.387  
Crawford suggests instead that the push for nondiscrimination helps foster 
diverse and unknown types of human interactions that occur over networks 
governed by nondiscrimination principles.388  Professor Anthony Varona 
has echoed this sentiment, suggesting that “calls for net neutrality should be 
broadened to encompass not only competitive and antitrust considerations 
but also the effects that commoditization of bit transport would have on 
opportunities for noncommercial, local political and democratic 
engagement online.”389
Whether a federal oversight regime for broadband practices simply 
should be focused on competitive harms or whether it should delve into 
issues relating to the elements discussed above is only preliminary to the 
question of which federal agency is appropriate.  As indicated, the antitrust 
authorities are almost entirely focused upon the competitive concerns of a 
given transaction or activity, while the FCC often relies upon its use of the 
“public interest” or the “public convenience” in mandating rules under the 
Communications Act.
 
390  The notion of the “public interest” itself has come 
under much scrutiny, with critics lambasting the FCC’s application of this 
standard as vague or subject to political whim.391  Others express concern 
that, despite the public interest mandate in the Communications Act, the 
FCC has shifted toward evaluating media industry practices solely from the 
standpoint of competitive efficiency, to the exclusion of concerns regarding 
localism and diversity.392  For example, Professor Howard Shelanski 
describes two different approaches to interpreting the “public interest” in 
communications policy.393  The first is an “efficiency model” concerned 
solely with fostering a market that meets consumer demand.394  The 
second, the “democracy model,” seeks to promote a media landscape 
populated with quality, diverse programming.395
 
 387. See Susan P. Crawford, The Internet and the Project of Communications Law, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 359, 389–91 (2007). 
  Shelanski suggests the 
“efficiency model” now takes precedence at the FCC, but that the 
 388. Id. at 390, 403. 
 389. Anthony E. Varona, Toward a Broadband Public Interest Standard, 61 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 1, 120 (2009). 
 390. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 214(a), 310(d) (2006). 
 391. See Barkow & Huber, supra note 333, at 42–43 (describing the “public interest” as 
“amorphous” and stating that the FCC uses whatever standard it deems convenient at the 
time of its rulemaking). But see Thomas M. Koutsky & Lawrence J. Spiwak, Separating 
Politics From Policy in FCC Merger Reviews:  A Basic Legal Primer of the “Public 
Interest” Standard, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 329, 338 (2010) (arguing that the “public 
interest” standard is delineated by applicable judicial precedent). 
 392. See Shelanski, supra note 374, at 388. 
 393. Id. at 383–87. 
 394. Id. 
 395. Id. 
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“democracy model” is still raised with respect to media diversity concerns 
and the promotion of particular programming.396  While thus arguing that 
the FCC has abandoned elements of the public interest in some instances, 
Shelanski further asserts that an antitrust regime would be ill-suited to 
fostering either the “democracy” or “efficiency” model in media 
markets.397
2.  Media Ownership Rules and Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC 
 
Among the FCC actions that might impact the Commission’s approach to 
broadband regulation is its treatment of media ownership rules.398  Over the 
years, the FCC enacted a number of rules that have imposed restrictions 
upon the number of media entities one organization can own on both a 
national and local level.399  Beginning in the 1940s, these rules included 
disallowing a firm from owning more than one television station in one 
community, as well as a cap on the percentage of the national broadcast 
audience that could be reached by stations that were under one firm’s 
control.400  Additionally, a rule imposed in the 1970s dictated that a single 
company could not own a newspaper and a television station in the same 
local community.401  The motivation for these rules was the promotion of 
local and diverse media programming in the name of the “public 
interest.”402
Media ownership regulation began to come under strain in the 1980s, 
when deregulatory sentiments at the FCC led to efforts to eliminate the 
nationwide ownership limitations.
 
403  Ultimately, Congress interceded in 
proceedings that would have led to complete deregulation and in 1984 
increased the authorized ownership level to twenty-five percent of the 
national viewing audience.404
 
 396. Id. at 387–89. 
  The passage of the 1996 Act continued this 
deregulatory pattern.  There, Congress specifically directed the FCC to raise 
 397. Id. at 397, 402. 
 398. Cf. John Blevins, A Fragile Foundation—The Role of “Intermodal” and “Facilities-
Based” Competition in Communications Policy, 60 ALA. L. REV. 241, 249 (2009) 
(suggesting that the deregulatory regimes for both broadband Internet service and media 
ownership policies were influenced by the FCC’s belief that consumers had access to 
competitive alternatives). 
 399. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 378–79. 
 400. See id.; see also Broadcast Services Other Than Standard Broadcast, 6 Fed. Reg. 
2282, 2284–85 (May 6, 1941). 
 401. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 378; see also Amendment of 
Sections 73.34, 73.240, & 73.636 of the Comm’n’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of 
Standard, FM, & Television Broad. Stations, 50 F.C.C. 2d 1046, 1047 (1975) [hereinafter 
Multiple Ownership Rules] (2d rep. and order). 
 402. See, e.g., Multiple Ownership Rules, supra note 401, at 1048 (“Section 309(a) [of 
the Communications Act] specifically requires the Commission to find that the granting of a 
license serves the public interest, convenience, and necessity. The term public interest 
encompasses many factors including ‘the widest possible dissemination of information from 
diverse and antagonistic sources.’” (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 
20 (1945))). 
 403. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 378–79. 
 404. See id. at 379. 
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the national ownership limit to thirty-five percent of the national viewing 
audience.405  Additionally, Section 202(h) of the 1996 Act directed the FCC 
to conduct quadrennial reviews of its media ownership rules and, upon 
review, to “repeal or modify any regulation it determines to be no longer in 
the public interest.”406  Pursuant to this mandate, in a 2003 order407 (2003 
Media Ownership Order), the Commission made substantial revisions to—
or repealed—a number of its ownership rules.408  The FCC concluded that 
the public interest could be served by increasing the national audience cap 
to forty-five percent.409  The Commission also made significant changes to 
its cross-ownership rules, eliminating the rule entirely in large markets.410  
The FCC relied upon a number of different factors as having obviated the 
need for the rules, pointing to the rise of competitive cable stations and the 
Internet as a source of diverse media voices in relaxing its requirements.411
In making these changes to its ownership rules, the FCC was acting not 
simply based on the statutory language in section 202(h).  Instead, the 
deregulatory bent of the 2003 Media Ownership Order was partially 
grounded in two decisions from the D.C. Circuit interpreting section 202(h).  
In the first, Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC,
 
412 the D.C. Circuit held 
that the language in 202(h) requiring the Commission to determine if its 
media ownership rules were “necessary in the public interest” created “a 
presumption in favor of repealing or modifying the ownership rules.”413  
The Fox court rejected what it described as the FCC’s earlier “wait-and-
see” approach to section 202(h) determinations where it had failed to justify 
the continued implementation of the national ownership cap through a 
sufficient evidentiary record.414
 
 405. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(c)(1)(B), 110 Stat. 56, 
111 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 303 note (2006) (Broadcast Ownership)). 
  The Fox decision served to remand the 
review of the media ownership rules to the FCC, with a seemingly clear 
directive that the FCC carried the burden of showing that the continued use 
 406. Id. § 202(h).  The 1996 Act initially required biennial review of the ownership rules, 
but Congress amended this in 2004 to provide for quadrennial review. See Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629, 118 Stat. 3, 99–100 (codified at 47 
U.S.C. § 303 note).  
 407. See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Comm’n’s Broad. Ownership 
Rules, 18 FCC Rcd. 13,620 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 Media Ownership Order]. 
 408. See Shelanski, supra note 374, at 379–80; see also NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra 
note 15, at 380. 
 409. 2003 Media Ownership Order, supra note 407, at 13,814–15.  After public outrage 
over the increase, Congress reduced the national viewership ownership limit to thirty-nine 
percent.  See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 381. 
 410. 2003 Media Ownership Order, supra note 407, at 13,800–03; see also Shelanski, 
supra note 374, at 380. 
 411. 2003 Media Ownership Order, supra note 407, at 13,623 (“Our current rules 
inadequately account for the competitive presence of cable, ignore the diversity-enhancing 
value of the Internet, and lack any sound basis for a national audience reach cap.”); see also 
NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 381. 
 412. 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir.), modified on reh’g, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 413. Id. at 1048. 
 414. Id. at 1044. 
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of the extant media ownership rules remained “necessary in the public 
interest.”415
A second significant judicial antecedent to the FCC’s 2003 Media 
Ownership Order was the D.C. Circuit’s 2002 decision in Sinclair 
Broadcasting Group v. FCC.
 
416  In Sinclair, the court reviewed the FCC’s 
decision to partially relax its local broadcast station ownership rules, which 
had disallowed one entity from owning two separate broadcast stations in 
the same geographic region.417  In 1999, under the aegis of section 202(h), 
the FCC had loosened this requirement for the first time, allowing a 
company to own multiple broadcast stations in the same community so long 
as eight independently owned television stations would remain in the 
designated geographic region, and both stations were not ranked within the 
top four broadcast stations in the locality.418  In modifying this rule without 
abolishing it, the Commission argued that it was seeking to balance its 
interest in maintaining diversity in the broadcast arena with changes 
wrought in recent years that had resulted in a variety of new media 
entrants.419  Sinclair Broadcasting brought a challenge to the revised limits, 
arguing that the FCC was required to abolish the rule entirely.420  While the 
D.C. Circuit acknowledged that it normally gives strong deference to the 
agency’s determination with respect to its belief of what is necessary to 
foster diversity, the court found that the Commission had failed to offer 
appropriate evidence as to why it excluded non-broadcast media outlets 
from its eight independent station requirement.421  As in Fox, the Sinclair 
court criticized the FCC for adopting a “‘wait-and-see approach’” with 
respect to including non-broadcast outlets in its independent voices 
count.422  After review, the court remanded the local ownership limitations 
to the Commission with a mandate to justify their continued existence with 
a more complete evidentiary record.423
Fox and Sinclair thus served as motivation for the FCC’s deregulatory 
approach toward review of the media ownership rules.
 
424
 
 415. Id.; see also Shelanski, supra note 
  In the 2003 
Media Ownership Order, the FCC expressly recognized that it was acting 
under the presumptions and evidentiary requirements of Fox and Sinclair, 
and acknowledged that those courts’ interpretations of section 202(h) 
mandated that the burden rested upon those attempting to maintain the 
374, at 378. 
 416. 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 417. Id. at 154–55. 
 418. Review of the Comm’n’s Regulations Governing Television Broad., 14 FCC Rcd. 
12,903, 12,933 (1999) (rep. and order). 
 419. Id. at 12,904. 
 420. Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 152. 
 421. Id. at 161, 162–63. 
 422. Id. at 162–64 (quoting Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1042 
(D.C. Cir. 2002)). 
 423. Id. at 169. 
 424. See Shelanski, supra note 374, at 379 (“[S]tatutory mandates, past FCC decisions, 
and the courts played important roles in defining the scope and substance of the review and 
in creating a complex set of pressures to deregulate.”). 
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ownership rules.425  This frame of reference influenced the FCC’s decision 
to make the significant changes discussed above.426
The Commission’s actions in the 2003 Media Ownership Order prompted 
a considerable backlash from those opposing further media deregulation.
 
427  
In addition to the direct response from Congress regarding the national 
ownership cap,428 the portions of the FCC’s order concerning local 
ownership limitations were challenged in court.429  In 2004, the Third 
Circuit invalidated much of the 2003 Media Ownership Order in 
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC.430  In doing so, the Third Circuit 
acknowledged that the FCC had the ability to modify or repeal its 
ownership rules under section 202(h), but concluded that the Commission 
had once again failed to provide a comprehensive evidentiary record 
supporting its determinations that maintaining the rules was no longer in the 
public interest.431
First, the Prometheus court rejected the section 202(h) readings of Fox 
and Sinclair, concluding instead that section 202(h) provides no statutory 
presumption in favor of eliminating the rules.
   
432  With respect to the 
Commission’s decision to relax the rule barring ownership of both a 
newspaper and television station in the same geographic market, the Third 
Circuit took issue with the “diversity index” that the FCC had developed as 
a way of measuring whether cross-ownership would allow for a significant 
number of diverse news sources within a locality.433  In particular, the court 
determined that the FCC had overvalued the Internet as a source for local 
media content, and that the FCC irrationally did this in light of the 
Commission’s decision to exclude cable news sources from the diversity 
calculus.434  The court additionally chastised the Commission for assigning 
equal market shares in its diversity index to each of the firms within a 
certain medium, even though the FCC had assigned different diversity 
values to distinct media.435  Finally, the court concluded that the new cross-
ownership regime set up in the 2003 Media Ownership Order had been 
inconsistently derived from the formula that the FCC had developed using 
the diversity index.436  The result of Prometheus was a remand of the cross-
ownership rules to the FCC, with an admonishment to provide better 
evidentiary support for its rulemaking.437
 
 425. 2003 Media Ownership Order, supra note 
  The 2003 Media Ownership 
Order’s loosening of the bar on a company’s ability to own multiple 
407, at 13,624–25, 13,722. 
 426. See supra notes 407–11 and accompanying text. 
 427. See, e.g., NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 380–82; Shelanski, supra note 
374, at 381. 
 428. See supra note 409 and accompanying text. 
 429. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 430. Id. at 435. 
 431. Id. at 382. 
 432. Id. at 393–94; see also NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 382 & n.96. 
 433. Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 403–04. 
 434. Id. at 405–06. 
 435. Id. at 408–09. 
 436. Id. at 411. 
 437. Id. at 408–09, 411–12. 
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television stations within the same geographic region met a similar fate, as 
the Prometheus court remanded the rule to the FCC on the grounds that it 
had failed to justify why it had chosen the specific regime it adopted.438
The FCC, pursuant to the section 202(h) directive, took up the 
Prometheus remand in its next quadrennial review of the media ownership 
rules.
 
439  There, the FCC determined that many of the extant ownership 
rules remained necessary in the public interest.440  It decided to alter only 
one rule, allowing an owner of a broadcast television station to also own a 
newspaper in the same community but only in the largest markets, and 
subject to the requirements that (1) the station cannot be in the top four 
stations in the market, and (2) there must still be eight independent “major 
media voices” in the particular market.441  That determination is currently 
being challenged before the Third Circuit.442
The result of the strange path from the 1996 Act’s mandate in section 
202(h) to review of the ownership rules through Fox, Sinclair, and 
Prometheus is that the media ownership rules have barely changed.  From 
the standpoint of the development of broadband video distribution, which 
itself casts a new shadow over the question of media control, the media 
ownership proceedings show what can happen when an agency attempts to 
tackle issues beyond the question of competition policy.
 
443
3.  Program Access Rules 
 
Program access rules are another component of FCC media regulation 
that relate to the concerns raised in the broadband video market.  Pursuant 
to the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 
1992444 (Cable Act), cable providers are required to make satellite-
delivered programming that they own or control available to rival MVPD 
services at reasonable rates.445  This rule functions to bar MVPDs from 
carrying popular programming exclusively through their own MVPD 
services, which would arguably make their services more attractive to 
consumers and perpetuate their market dominance.446
 
 438. Id. at 418–20. 
  Like the media 
ownership rules, the program access rules have had a contentious 
procedural history at the FCC.  When Congress initially established the 
 439. See 2006 Quadrennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Comm’n’s Broad. 
Ownership Rules & Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecomms. Act of 
1996, 23 FCC Rcd. 2010 (2007) (rep. and order and order on reconsideration). 
 440. Id. at 2016–17 (noting that, while the media landscape was undergoing changes, 
most consumers continued to rely on traditional media sources such as broadcast television 
and newspapers for their local news and information sources). 
 441. Id. at 2019. 
 442. See, e.g., Katy Bachman, Media Ownership Rules in Limbo, MEDIA ACCESS PROJECT 
(Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.mediaaccess.org/2011/02/media-ownership-rules-in-limbo/. 
 443. See Shelanski, supra note 374, at 381 (suggesting that ownership changes that result 
in a loss of diverse viewpoints leads to more public outcry than ownership changes where 
the result is only pecuniary). 
 444. Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 19, 106 Stat. 1460, 1494 (1992). 
 445. 47 U.S.C. § 548 (2006). 
 446. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 15, at 369–70. 
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program access rules in 1992, the Cable Act provided that the rules would 
sunset after ten years unless the FCC affirmatively found them to still be 
necessary to promote competition and diversity in video programming 
distribution.447  The FCC, upon review in 2002, extended the rules through 
October 2007,448 and then again extended them until October 2012,449 in 
each instance contending that the continuance of the rules was necessary for 
a competitive and diverse MVPD marketplace.450  In addition, in 2010, the 
FCC extended the reach of the program access rules to bar exclusive 
arrangements for programming that is delivered terrestrially.451  The last 
order was passed over the dissent of Commissioner McDowell, who argued 
that the FCC had no authority to extend the rules to terrestrial distribution 
given the Cable Act’s express reference to satellite-delivered 
programming.452
The continued existence and scope of the program access rules are likely 
to be critical in the broadband video distribution market.  As discussed 
above, the FCC and DOJ imposed upon Comcast requirements that it make 
NBCU content available to broadband competitors.
 
453  There are many 
issues surrounding this potential requirement, including how the FCC 
would go about determining which online distributors would qualify as 
rival MVPDs and thus have access to NBCU content.454  However, because 
an important component of Comcast’s decision to acquire NBCU was likely 
to buttress its TV Everywhere online model against other online 
competitors, the imposition of program access rules could effectively 
eliminate the vertical efficiencies of the merger,455 and might also impose a 
MVPD-type model on the developing broadband space.456
C.  Questions of Procedure:  Finding an Optimal Approach to Broadband 
Oversight 
 
Apart from the substantive considerations addressed above, 
commentators have debated whether antitrust law or FCC regulation 
provides the best procedural mechanism to address concerns in a dynamic 
broadband landscape.  The issue of whether broadband video concerns 
should be handled through FCC regulation or antitrust oversight presents a 
 
 447. 47 U.S.C. § 548(c)(5). 
 448. See Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection & Competition 
Act of 1992, 17 FCC Rcd. 12,124, 12,124 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 Cable Implementation] 
(rep. and order). 
 449. See Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection & Competition 
Act of 1992, 22 FCC Rcd. 17,791, 17,792 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 Cable Implementation] 
(rep. and order and notice of proposed rulemaking). 
 450. See 2002 Cable Implementation, supra note 448, at 12,125; 2007 Cable 
Implementation, supra note 449, at 17,792. 
 451. See Review of the Comm’n’s Program Access Rules & Examination of 
Programming Tying Arrangements, 25 FCC Rcd. 746, 747 (2010) (1st rep. and order). 
 452. Id. at 822 (McDowell, Comm’r, dissenting). 
 453. See supra note 349 and accompanying text. 
 454. See Peers, supra note 144. 
 455. See id. 
 456. See supra note 354 and accompanying text. 
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challenge of balancing the institutional merits of each agency.457  In 
general, outside of the merger review context, the antitrust approach to 
competition oversight is straightforward:  the DOJ and FTC enforce the 
antitrust laws on a case-by-case basis, building evidence after a violation 
arises.458  Conversely, the FCC often conducts its regulatory oversight 
through ex ante rulemaking.459  However, in the 2009 NPRM, the FCC 
sought comment on whether its oversight of broadband practices should 
proceed through case-by-case determinations.460  Moreover, the FCC’s Net 
Neutrality Order appears to have embraced the notion of a case-by-case 
adjudication methodology, at least with respect to determining when a 
broadband provider’s actions constitute “reasonable network 
management.”461
Either an FCC or antitrust regime would likely face procedural 
drawbacks when engaging the dynamic broadband video landscape.  The 
FCC in particular is often criticized for a lack of a proper evidentiary record 
in its rulemaking proceedings.
 
462  The Fox, Sinclair, and Prometheus cases 
demonstrate the extent to which judges find failings in the FCC’s order-
making process:  courts in those cases were consistently critical of the 
FCC’s failure to produce a robust and logical evidentiary record to support 
the Commission’s decisions.463  Evidentiary concerns were also addressed 
in the Net Neutrality Order by Commissioner Meredith Attwell Baker who, 
in dissent, roundly criticized the majority’s decision to promulgate broad 
rules despite a lack of evidence of anticompetitive broadband practices.464  
These types of critiques have frequently been raised against the 
Commission;465
 
 457. See Weiser, supra note 
 some observers view the institutional paradigm as running 
301, at 318 (“[T]he most nettlesome policy challenge is to 
develop and implement an effective institutional framework to enforce any system of 
managing the competition policy issues associated with overseeing the terms of dealing 
between applications providers and network owners.”). 
 458. See Weiss & Stern, supra note 282, at 195; see also Barkow & Huber, supra note 
333, at 37 (suggesting that the role of the DOJ is “to interfere only as is necessary to keep 
markets free and competitive”). 
 459. See Weiss & Stern, supra note 281, at 195. 
 460. See supra note 236 and accompanying text. 
 461. Net Neutrality Order, supra note 176, at 48; see also supra note 267 and 
accompanying text. 
 462. See Shelanski, supra note 374, at 418–19 (describing the evidentiary support that 
courts reviewing the FCC’s media ownership decisions require); Speta, supra note 375, at 
117 (suggesting that the FCC’s Comcast decision was made with “very little in the way of 
rigorous fact-finding”). 
 463. See supra notes 414, 421, 431 and accompanying text. 
 464. Net Neutrality Order, supra note 176, at 182–83 (Baker, Comm’r, dissenting) 
(noting that the majority opinion uses the word “could” over sixty times in providing support 
for the need to police broadband practices).  The Net Neutrality Order lists only four 
concrete examples of violations of its open internet policies:  (1) the Madison River consent 
decree, (2) the Comcast/BitTorrent dispute, (3) an example of an exclusionary contract 
between a wireless company and a payment service company, and (4) an example of a 
mobile provider restricting access to applications on its wireless network. Id. at 21 & nn. 
104–05. 
 465. See, e.g., Speta, supra note 309, at 129 (suggesting that the FCC’s “behavior, 
historically and especially recently, has ranged from impeding competition to the simply 
bizarre”); see also supra note 391 and accompanying text. 
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so deep that they suggest that, in a broadband world, the FCC must adopt 
policies akin to the way antitrust authorities handle claims in order to 
provide effective oversight.466
Despite the seeming preferred status that antitrust has assumed as an 
institutional body, even those who favor an antitrust-like approach to 
broadband oversight have recognized a variety of shortcomings in the 
procedural approaches that the DOJ and the FTC must follow in enforcing 
antitrust law.  The first of these concerns is that the antitrust agencies’ 
reliance on the court system for enforcement can lead to problematic delays 
in resolving issues in a developing marketplace.
 
467  Moreover, for private 
parties, antitrust can represent an extremely costly enforcement measure.468
The second issue that leads commentators to question the institutional 
efficacy of antitrust is the contention that the DOJ and the FTC lack the 
necessary expertise to handle complex issues related to broadband and 
telecommunications policy.  As an agency dedicated to communications 
policy, the FCC is presumed to possess a level of experience and industry 
expertise that allows it to best address broadband concerns.
 
469  However, 
others downplay this assessment, arguing that the FCC is no more capable 
of addressing market ills in the broadband sector than antitrust 
authorities.470
IV.  A DEREGULATORY POSTURE FOR A DEVELOPING MARKET 
 
The rise of broadband video is beginning to affect the media landscape 
dramatically, as the convergence of media distribution to broadband 
networks rearranges the relationships between consumers, content creators, 
and distributors.471
 
 466. See, e.g., Weiser, supra note 
  Among the changes being wrought are agreements 
301, at 318 (“As commentators increasingly emphasize, 
the future of telecommunications regulation is for the FCC to reorient its mission to 
evaluating conduct after the fact using antitrust-like standards.”). 
 467. See Brenner, supra note 346, at 62 & n.189 (suggesting that antitrust presents a 
“good way” to conceptualize broadband policy concerns, but that it is lacking as an 
institution equipped to achieve timely remedy); Speta, supra note 290, at 19 (suggesting that 
antitrust reliance on case-by-case adjudication leads to “delay and nonuniformity” of 
results). But see Net Neutrality Order, supra note 176, at 152 (McDowell, Comm’r, 
dissenting) (arguing that the network neutrality rules adopted by the FCC are unnecessary 
because “[i]f market failure were to occur . . . America’s antitrust and consumer protection 
laws stand at the ready.  Both the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission 
are well equipped to cure any market ills.”). 
 468. See Blevins, supra note 398, at 286. 
 469. See, e.g., Koutsky & Spiwak, supra note 391, at 332–33 (discussing, in the context 
of dual merger review, that “the antitrust enforcement agencies simply may not have the 
industry expertise to understand all of the complexities and nuances of the telecom 
business”); Speta, supra note 309, at 130 (suggesting that the FCC should be charged with 
policing net neutrality concerns, in part because of “institutional expertise” and 
“experience”). 
 470. See Nuechterlein, supra note 171, at 61–62 (arguing that the need for the FCC’s 
technical expertise is overstated); see generally Brenner, supra note 346, at 48–54 
(discussing instances where the FCC failed to acknowledge or comprehend technical 
considerations that should have impacted its regulatory decisions). 
 471. See supra notes 64–70 and accompanying text. 
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between media participants that integrate content and distribution channels 
in an effort to gain dominance in this emerging marketplace.472  These 
arrangements and the nature of this market have led to rising tensions in the 
broadband video marketplace, and create the potential that traditional 
distributors will be incentivized to take anticompetitive action against the 
new entrants.473  As this marketplace has gained prominence and these 
conflicts have become increasingly apparent, federal authorities have begun 
to assess the need for regulatory intervention to prevent market harm.474  
The FCC reacted to these possible conflicts by promulgating rules that 
purport to prevent broadband providers from discriminating against online 
distributors,475 despite a significant judicial defeat with respect to its 
authority over broadband practices.476
This part contends that, absent congressional action, the FCC lacks the 
jurisdictional authority to mount an effective oversight regime over 
broadband practices.  Moreover, this part argues that, even assuming that 
the Commission is able to overcome these jurisdictional deficiencies, the 
current regime of prophylactic rules promulgated by the FCC is an 
inappropriate method of regulation for the broadband video market.  
Instead, this part proposes that, absent systemic market harms, oversight of 
this developing marketplace should be left to the antitrust authorities. 
 
A.  The FCC’s Cloudy Jurisdictional Picture 
Following Comcast, the first question to ask regarding government 
oversight of broadband video distribution is whether the FCC possesses 
jurisdiction over this developing marketplace.  This issue remains relevant 
because the Commission continues to assert its authority over broadband 
practices, despite its defeat in the D.C. Circuit.477  As a result, the FCC 
faces continuing legal and political attacks that challenge its authority in 
this arena.478  The Commission may yet survive the political turmoil 
surrounding its recent actions,479
Drawing upon the Title I ancillary authority delineated by the Supreme 
Court in Southwestern Cable, Midwest I, and Midwest II,
 but its position as to its legal authority to 
regulate broadband practices should be rejected. 
480 the FCC has 
tethered its broadband regulatory efforts to Communications Act provisions 
that either espouse congressional policy, or that demarcate the 
Commission’s express authority to regulate common carriers, broadcasting, 
and cable services.481
 
 472. See supra notes 
  Indeed, broadband has become a critical component 
138–39 and accompanying text. 
 473. See supra notes 70, 372–73 and accompanying text. 
 474. See supra notes 144–47, 305–08 and accompanying text. 
 475. See supra notes 263–70 and accompanying text. 
 476. See supra notes 247–48 and accompanying text. 
 477. See supra notes 260–72 and accompanying text. 
 478. See supra notes 274–81 and accompanying text. 
 479. See supra note 281 and accompanying text. 
 480. See supra notes 188–97 and accompanying text. 
 481. See supra note 271 and accompanying text; see also Net Neutrality Order, supra 
note 176, at 63 (“[O]ur adoption of basic rules of the road for broadband providers 
2011] SEEKING A CLEARER PICTURE 2963 
of the communications system, and the FCC has received congressional 
indications of the need for Commission involvement in broadband 
expansion.482  But as presently formulated, the FCC’s efforts to regulate 
broadband practice strain the bounds of the Supreme Court’s ancillary 
jurisdiction doctrine and disregard a procedural mandate of the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision in Comcast.  Beginning with Southwestern Cable, the 
Supreme Court’s ancillary jurisdiction cases promulgated a rule that gives 
the FCC flexibility to take action where doing so is necessary to enforce the 
substantive provisions of the Communications Act.483  But this jurisdiction 
is not unfettered:  the FCC’s Title I authority exists only as a limited grant 
and, as interpreted by the Comcast court, requires the FCC to defend its 
exercise on a case-by-case basis.484  However, instead of proceeding 
against concrete instances of harms, the FCC’s latest effort to regulate 
broadband in the Net Neutrality Order seeks to enforce “prophylactic” rules 
over Internet practice.485  The Net Neutrality Order amounts to a patchwork 
of provisions sewn together to provide the Commission with Title I 
authority over the entire broadband sector.486  It is difficult to square the 
breadth of this assertion of authority with the particularized regulatory 
interventions that led the Supreme Court to recognize the development of 
the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine.487  Moreover, the Commission is 
promulgating its rules in the face of hypothetical harms,488 further 
suggesting that it has failed to show how its regulation of broadband is 
“‘reasonably ancillary to the . . . effective performance of its statutorily 
mandated responsibilities.’”489
Additionally, there are pragmatic concerns regarding the Commission’s 
ability to effectuate a governance regime under Title I.  Because the 
Commission lacks express authority over the Internet,
 
490 it must shoehorn 
its regulation of broadband practices to the express authority given to it 
under the substantive provisions of the Communications Act.491
 
implements specific statutory mandates in the Communications Act and the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.”). 
  But the 
developments of the past decade—principally those resulting from the 
 482. See supra notes 2–4, 31–32 and accompanying text. 
 483. See supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text. 
 484. See supra notes 197, 256 and accompanying text. 
 485. See supra note 264 and accompanying text. 
 486. See supra notes 265–67, 271 and accompanying text. 
 487. See supra notes 188–97 and accompanying text.  Concurring with the plurality in 
Midwest I that the FCC could exercise its Title I jurisdiction to force cable systems to create 
original programming, Chief Justice Warren Burger expressed his reservations regarding 
further non-statutory expansion of the Commission’s authority. See United States v. Midwest 
Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 676 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“Candor requires 
acknowledgment, for me at least, that the Commission’s position strains the outer limits of 
even the open-ended and pervasive jurisdiction that has evolved by decisions of the 
Commission and the courts.”). 
 488. See supra note 464 and accompanying text. 
 489. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Am. Library Ass’n. v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). 
 490. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 491. See supra notes 180–83, 191–92 and accompanying text. 
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spread of broadband—demonstrate that the services regulated in Titles II, 
III, and VI of the Communications Act are themselves undergoing 
considerable change.  Under a Title I structure where the Commission must 
separately justify each use of its ancillary authority, the FCC may be 
confronted with a need to constantly reevaluate its posture toward 
broadband against the moving target of the broader communications 
system.492  There are reasons to doubt the Commission’s ability to adapt 
properly to such volatile regulatory circumstances.  For example, the 
discussion regarding media ownership rules demonstrates how the 
Commission, even when presented with a directive from Congress, has 
struggled to convince reviewing courts that it is properly adapting its 
rulemaking to changed circumstances.493  More general critiques of FCC 
methodology further suggest that, as an institution, the Commission may be 
unable to maintain an effective oversight regime over broadband in the 
absence of express statutory directive.494
The form of sweeping prophylactic measures that the FCC has taken in 
the Net Neutrality Order may not be the most effective way for the 
Commission to address structural concerns in the marketplace for 
broadband video distribution.  The Commission’s jurisdiction over 
telecommunications and media mergers, while often criticized, remains 
unquestioned.
 
495  In its recent review of the Comcast/NBCU merger, the 
FCC demonstrated the extent to which this authority can be utilized to 
extract conditions from major players in the broadband video 
marketplace.496  Putting aside the merits of the conditions, the terms that 
the joint FCC and DOJ effort was able to obtain from the merged entity 
substantially address many of the conflicts raised in the broadband video 
marketplace.497
B.  Beyond Jurisdiction:  The Need for Regulation 
  These terms suggest that the Commission may be best 
served by reserving its efforts to those instances where a specific 
transaction raises considerable competitive concerns. 
Even if the FCC can overcome the jurisdictional obstacles it faces in 
erecting an enforceable regulatory regime under its ancillary authority, the 
Commission’s current approach to overseeing the market for broadband 
video distribution should be rejected in favor of a hands-off, antitrust-led 
regime.  Within this developing marketplace, despite the potential for 
anticompetitive harm, there have as yet been no instances that exclaim the 
need for continued regulatory oversight.498
 
 492. See supra notes 
  Indeed, examples where 
supposed antagonistic parties have made distribution arrangements in this 
developing space belie the Commission’s insistence that preemptive 
255–56 and accompanying text. 
 493. See supra notes 406, 408, 414, 421–22, 431 and accompanying text. 
 494. See supra notes 462–66 and accompanying text. 
 495. See supra notes 329–35 and accompanying text. 
 496. See supra notes 348–54 and accompanying text. 
 497. See supra notes 143–48 and accompanying text. 
 498. See supra note 464 and accompanying text. 
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regulation is necessary to protect online distributors from discriminatory 
actions.499  Even where tensions have flared, this should not give rise 
immediately to concerns about systematic anticompetitive practices.  
Instead, the problems in cases such as the Comcast-Level 3 dispute500 
simply should be seen as inevitable business disputes between network 
participants as they respond to significant changes to market structure. At 
most, such instances raise cause for concern, but are insufficient to provide 
the basis to enact broad, prophylactic rules.  Given that the broadband video 
market is in its infancy, regulators should be wary of taking action without 
a clear finding of market harm.501
The FCC’s actions are also problematic because of their substantive 
impact on the broadband video marketplace.  The FCC’s prophylactic 
adoption of non-blocking and non-discrimination rules forecloses 
stakeholders in the broadband distribution market from entering into 
agreements that may produce beneficial results.
 
502  At present, the growth 
of broadband distribution is undermining many of the traditional revenue 
streams in the media distribution business.503  In the FCC’s push to regulate 
the relationship between online distributors and broadband providers, the 
forgotten component of this system seems to be content producers, who 
have complex affiliations with both sides of this emerging conflict.504  It 
seems likely that content providers, in an effort to sustain revenue models 
that are collapsing in the broadband era,505 will encourage experimentation 
in distribution systems at both the application level and the network 
level.506  This necessity commands a flexible approach to market remedy 
that promotes innovation at all levels, and that intervenes only where 
market harm is clearly delineated.507
It may seem odd to reject FCC intervention in the broadband video 
marketplace.  After all, the broadband distribution of video is linked closely 
to other areas of communications policy where the FCC has had plenary 
jurisdiction since 1934.
 
508  Moreover, Congress has directed the 
Commission to promote the adoption of broadband services in the United 
States.509
 
 499. See supra note 
  However, it remains to be seen whether the rationales previously 
used to justify FCC entry into communications markets are applicable here.  
The companies involved in this market, far from being small, independent 
entities in need of regulatory oversight for survival, are often major 
corporations in retailing, equipment manufacturing, and digital 
136 and accompanying text. 
 500. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text. 
 501. See supra notes 306–07 and accompanying text. 
 502. See supra note 382 and accompanying text. 
 503. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
 504. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text. 
 505. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
 506. See supra notes 381–83 and accompanying text. 
 507. See supra note 382 and accompanying text. 
 508. See supra notes 178–79 and accompanying text. 
 509. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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distribution.510  In addition, it is unclear whether the public interest 
concerns that have spawned much of the FCC’s entry into media markets 
through the media ownership rules and program access rules are present in a 
distribution market that is unmoored from the geographical limitations and 
physical scarcity that prompt calls for diversity and localism.511  Instead, 
the concerns in the present marketplace for broadband video distribution are 
focused almost entirely on the need for robust competition.  Viewed 
through this competitive prism, it is difficult to argue that consumers are not 
benefitting from present market conditions.  A variety of competitive, 
inexpensive means for viewing professional video content have developed 
under the deregulated status quo.512
Under present circumstances, a regime governed by antitrust should 
replace the FCC’s prophylactic rules.  Instead of rushing to impose rules on 
market activities, the developments in broadband video distribution should 
be viewed under modern antitrust law.
 
513  Although there may be some 
concerns with the efficacy of continued antitrust oversight of the 
communications sector,514
The broadband video market may eventually manifest anticompetitive 
practices that require considerable regulatory involvement.  If that occurs, 
FCC oversight may be appropriate.  Until then, the FCC should resist the 
urge to be a “cop on the beat,”
 the FCC’s jurisdictional uncertainty is equally 
problematic.  Moreover, the dynamism of the broadband video marketplace 
should allay concerns regarding antitrust oversight.  Because the current 
marketplace for broadband video distribution is not plagued by entrenched 
dominant players or systematic market failure, it is not one in need of 
ongoing oversight and frequent intervention.  Instead, it is a marketplace of 
constant evolution; the developing concerns over anticompetitive acts 
should be viewed in light of the complexities of the market and as the 
byproduct of fundamental changes to the way film and television are 
delivered to consumers.  These circumstances demand not a rigid regulatory 
hand, but rather the looser approach of antitrust-as-backstop, with 
intervention only in the specific instances where it proves necessary to 
protect consumer interests. 
515
 
 and allow the broadband video 
distribution market to police itself. 
 
 
 510. See supra notes 97, 102–03, 106 and accompanying text. 
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 512. See supra notes 76, 91–92 and accompanying text. 
 513. See supra note 382 and accompanying text. 
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